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Abstract
In this thesis we are exploring some models for von Wright's preference logic. For a
given (initial) set of axioms and a set of formulae, some of them valid, some of them
problematic (in the sense that it is not always intuitively clear whether they should
be valid or not), we investigated some matrix semantics for those formulae including
semantics in relevance logics (rst degree entailment and RM3), various many{valued
(Kleene's,  Lukasiewicz's, : : : ) and/or paraconsistent logics, in Sugihara matrix, and
one interpretation for preference relation using modal operators  and . In each
case, we also investigated dependence results between various formulae. An opposite
problem (i.e. searching for a logic that satises given constraints) is also addressed. At
the end, a LISP program is presented that implements von Wright's logic as a decision
supporting system, i.e. that decides for a given set of preferences, what alternatives
(world situation) we should choose, according to von Wright's preference logic system.
Keywords
Logic of preference, vonWright, relevance logics, paraconsistent logics, many{valued logics,
decision supporting systems, LISP
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Chapter 1
Introduction and history
The whole story about the logic of preference and preference relations is an at-
tempt at the formalization of (rather fuzzy) feeling of preferring something, that is,
an attempt of axiomatic explanation why we choose one thing over another. His-
torically speaking, this relation is already mentioned in Aristotle's work, but rst
modern attempts have been made in the decade of 1950{1960. But, as von Wright
said in [vW72], contrary to the development in deontic logic, where authors mainly
agree with basic postulates of the theory, the situation in the logic of preference is
quite dierent. To quote ([vW72, p.141]):
: : :The `intuitions' of various researchers into this eld seem largely at
variance with one another. Is the preference relation transitive? Are any
two states or things comparable for preference; if one state is preferred
to another is, then, the negation of the second preferred to the negation
of the rst (`contraposition'); can a preference between disjunctions or
conjunctions be distributed, and if so, how? These are questions on
which there are almost as many divergent opinions as there have been
writers on the topic.
The concept of preference is also used in economics, but in a relation to `utility'
function. We can also split preferences into individual and group preferences, but
we are going to consider only individual preferences.
In the sequel, we are going to present only the most important systems, and for
the more complete presentation the reader is referred to [Hub72].
1.1 Martin's logic of preference
Martin presented this system, which was one of the rst, in [Mar63] in 1963. He
introduced two relations: X Prfr a; b; t, with intended meaning \Person X prefers
a to b in time t" and X Indi a; b; t as :(X Prfr a; b; t)^:(X Prfr b; a; t), where
a and b are sentences. The main properties of those relations (slightly simplied)
are:
(M1) X Prfr a; b; t! a 6= b
(M2) X Indi a; b; t! X Indi b; a; t
(M3) X Indi a; a; t
(M4) (X Prfr a; b; t) ^ (X Prfr b; c; t)! X Prfr a; c; t
(M5) (X Indi a; b; t) ^ (X Indi b; c; t)! X Indi a; c; t
(M6) (X Prfr a; b; t) _ (X Prfr b; a; t) _ (X Indi a; b; t)
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(M7) X Prfr a; b; t! :(X Prfr b; a; t)
(M8) X Prfr a; b; t$ X Prfr :b;:a; t
(M9) (X Prfr a; c; t) _ (X Prfr b; c; t)! X Prfr (a _ b); c; t
(M10) X Prfr c; (a _ b); t! (X Prfr c; a; t) ^ (X Prfr c; b; t)
(M11) If a is a theorem, and b a false statement, then X Prfr a; b; t.
(M12) If a is true, and b false, then X Prfr a; b; t.
(M13) If e is a non{false statement and if c(x; y) is a conformance degree of
statement x compared to y, then c(a; e) > c(b; e)$ X Prfr a; b; t.
1.2 Logic of preference Chisholm{Sosa
Roderik M. Chisholm and Ernest Sosa introduced their logic of preference in [CS66b]
in 1966. Except for a preference relation P , they also introduced the following
relations:
(D1) xSy $ :(xPy) ^ :(yPx) (`same in intrinsic value as')
(D2) Ix$ :(xP:x) ^ :(:xPx) (`is intrinsically indierent in value')
(D3) Nx$ (9y)(Iy ^ xSy) (`is intrinsically neutral in value')
(D4) Gx$ (9y)(Iy ^ xPy) (`is intrinsically good')
(D5) Bx$ (9y)(Iy ^ yPx) (`is intrinsically bad')
As for the axioms, their list of axioms is:
(C&S1) (8x)(8y)(xPy ! :(yPx))
(C&S2) (8x)(8y)(8z)(:(xPy) ^ :(yPz)! :(xPz))
(C&S3) (8x)(8y)(Ix ^ Iy ! xSy)
(C&S4) (8x)[(8y)(Iy ! xPy)! xP:x]
(C&S5) (8x)[(8y)(Iy ! yP:x)! xP:x]
In [CS66a], authors slightly modied their logic, and instead of (C&S4) and
(C&S5) they introduced axiom:
(C&S40) (8x)[(8y)(Iy ! xPy) _ (8y)(Iy ! yP:x)! xP:x]
Chisholm and Sosa strongly object to von Wright's and Martin's principles
xPy $ (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x) and xPy $ :yP:x, giving examples that are often
cited when discussing various principles of preference logic ([CS66a, p.322]):
Given such principles, we cannot say, as the other systems do, that if
p is preferable to q then not{q is preferable to not{p. There being happy
Americans (p) is intrinsically preferable to there being stones (q), since
the former entails the existence of pleasure and of no displeasure and
the latter entails the existence of neither. But, there being no stones
(not{q) is not intrinsically preferable to there being no happy Americans
(not{p) since neither of these negative states of aairs entails that any
pleasure exists or that any displeasure exists.
For similar reasons, we must reject the following formula:
pPq  (p&  q)P (q&  p)
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which is sometimes taken as axiomatic; indeed we must say both that
the left hand expression does not imply the right, and also that the right
hand expression does not imply the left. Suppose that p is the state of
aairs which is its being false that there are three happy Greeks and that
q is the state of aairs which is there being two unhappy Romans; then
the expression on the left will be true and the expression on the right
will be false (indeed, q and not{p will be preferable to p and not{q). Or
suppose that p is the state of aairs which is there being stones and q is
that state of aairs which is there being no happy Americans; then the
expression on the right will be true, and the expression on the left will
be false.
But, to all those (and some other) objections, von Wright said in [vW72, p.148]:
: : :Criticism leveled against it on the ground that it is counterintuitive
have failed to convince me.
1.3 Hallden's logic of preference
Soren Hallden dened one preference system in [Hal66] that he connected with
modal logics. He used notation xBy for \If we have to choose between x and y,
then we should choose x", and xSy for \If we have to choose between x and y, then
we can choose x or we can as well choose y".
His axiom system is:
(H1) x! x
(H2) (x! y)! (x! y)
(H3) (x$ y)! :(xBy)
(H4) xBy ^ yBz ! xBz
(H5) (x$ y)! xSy
(H6) xSy ! ySx
(H7) xSy ^ ySz ! xSz
(H8) xSy ^ zSu! (xBz $ yBu)
1.4 Von Wright's logic of preference
It is generally credited by all authors working into this area that von Wright's con-
tribution was very important for the further developments in the logic of preference.
Von Wright published his rst work on that subject in 1963 in [vW63]. He says that
he will consider preferences between states of aairs because all other preference
types (i.e. between objects and between actions) can be reduced to this kind of pref-
erences. For operations on states of aairs, he chooses standard boolean connectives
of classical propositional logic as he said in [vW72] on page 143:
: : : States of aairs can be called proposition{like entries. This means
that they can be negated and that we can form with them molecular
compounds which can be handled in accordance with the laws of propo-
sitional logic (PL).
Furthermore, he distinguishes two kind of preferences: extrinsic { for which we
can state rational reasons why we prefer one state to another and which von Wright
does not investigate, and intrinsic for which we cannot state rational reasons why we
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choose something. Von Wright investigates this kind of preferences. Furthermore,
he says that all preferences should be considered relative to the person that chooses
and to the moment in time (see also how Martin introduced preference relation in
section 1.1 on page 3).
For his preference relation P , von Wright introduces the following axioms:
(W1) xPy ! :(yPx)
(W2) xPy ^ yPz ! xPz
(W3) xPy $ (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x)
(W4) (x _ y)P (z _ u)$ (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^
:y ^ u) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ u)
(W5) xPy $ (x^)P (y ^)^ (x^:)P (y ^:), where  is a new variable.
Von Wright also introduces a (weak) indierence relation xIy as :(xPy) ^
:(yPx) and a strong indierence (`value{equality') relation E. We say that xEy
if and only if (under no circumstances) neither state x ^ :y is preferred to y ^ :x
nor vice versa. For relation I, von Wright does not require any special property to
hold, and the reason for introducing E are the following two principles:
(E1) xPy ^ xEz ! zPy
(E2) xPy ^ yEz ! xPz
He gives the following reason for the existence of two dierent indierence re-
lations (see [vW63, pp.55{57]): As the formula xPy means that x is preferred to
y under all circumstances, according to the denition of I, xIy does not mean
any more under all circumstances, but under some circumstances. For indierence
under all circumstances, he introduces relation E.
In his another article ([vW72]) published in 1972, von Wright slightly changes
the system, or, to cite (on page 142):
Without abandoning its central tenets, I shall propose some changes
which at the same time will make the theory stronger and less complex
then it was in its original form.
Basically, von Wright says that preferences are holistic, i.e. relative to circum-
stances, and he introduces two dierent meanings for notion of preferring state s to
state t under circumstances Ci:
(D1) We say that s is preferred to t under circumstances Ci if and only if every
Ci{world that is also a s{world but not a t{world is preferred to every
Ci{world that is also a t{world but not a s{world.
(D2) We say that s is preferred to t under circumstances Ci if and only if
some Ci{world that is also a s{world is preferred to some Ci{world that
is also a t{world, but no Ci{world that is also a t{world is preferred to
any Ci{world that is also a s{world.
However, von Wright does not choose any of those denitions for the intended
one ([vW72, p.148]):
The two denitions are two ways of explicating the notation of a holistic
preference. Both ways seem to be reasonable. There is nothing to decide
between them on grounds of logic.
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He also does not want to address the problem of arguments of preference rela-
tion that are tautologies or contradictions. As for the axioms, von Wright drops
axiom (W2) and instead studies the following one (which he calls `Principle of Value
Comparability')
(W20) xPy ! xPz _ zPy
that he uses to prove (W2). Contraposition of this axiom gives axiom (C&S2) of
system Chisholm{Sosa. If we dene indierence relation in this system as :(xPy)^
:(yPx), we can readily see that this relation satises principles (E1) and (E2) (as
well as the usual condition that it is an equivalence relation).
Indeed: xPy ^ xEz ! xPy ^ :(xPz) ^ :(zPx) ! (xPz _ zPy) ^ :(xPz) ^
:(zPx) ! zPy ^ :(xPz) ^ :(zPx) ! zPy. That proves (E1), analogously for
(E2).
In that sense, the modied system is really a simplication of the original one,
because there are no (and also no need for) two dierent indierence relations. We
will mainly work with the original von Wright's system. We can also notice that
Hallden's axiom (H8) (see section 1.3) is also derivable in this extended system.
Indeed: Let us suppose that xIy and zIu. That means that :(xPy), :(yPx),
:(zPu) and :(uPz). Using (W20), we have xPz ! xPy _ yPz, and hence xPz !
yPz. Furthermore, yPz ! yPu_uPz, and hence yPz ! yPu, which together give
xPz ! yPu. Similar in other direction. That proves the axiom (H8) of Hallden's
system.
1.5 Question of semantics
Rescher addressed semantics of preferences in [Res67]. He mainly used `utility{
function' approach.
For a set of worlds w1; w2; : : : ; wn he introduced measure #, which he calls `index
of merit', as a function from set of worlds to real numbers. Using this measure, he
dened an interpretation P# in the following way:
P# if #() > #():
He also introduced another measure ?()
def
= #()   #(:) and, accordingly,
another interpretation:
P ? if ? () > ?():
For von Wright's preference relation, he introduced von Wright's semantics in
the following way: Let, as before, w1; : : : wn be a set of worlds (states of aairs
in von Wright's terminology), and suppose that there exists a preferential order >
together with the indierence ' between worlds. We say that Pw if
(8)(8w1)(8w2)(w1 j= ( ^ : ^ ) ^ w2 j= (: ^  ^ )! w1 > w2)
where  is independent of  and .
With the help of those semantics, Rescher investigated some of the more popular
axiomatizations and principles of logics of preference. It is interesting to note that
none of those semantics supports Chisholm's and Sosa's standpoint that principles
(W3) and (M8) should not hold. Moreover, in semantics Pw all von Wright's axioms
hold, except (W4) from right to left.
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1.6 Other approaches to semantics
The question of semantics was also addressed by Sven Danielsson in [Dan68]. In
this work, on pages 19{21, he gave one model for preference relation.
First, he introduced PC{valuation t, that is the usual valuation for propositional
formulae, then M{valuation (modal logic valuation) as an ordered pair (t;m), where
t is (above{dened) PC{valuation, and m is a mapping from the set of valuations
t into its power set, so that t0(p) = 1 if and only if t00(p) = 1 for some t00 2 m(t0).
Finally, he introduced i{valuation: i{valuation, relative to M{valuation (t;m),
is an ordered triple (OM; om;R), where:
 OM is a non{empty set;
 om is a function that to every propositional formula  so that t( ) = 1
assigns a non{empty subset of OM so that om(q) = om(r) if t((q $ r)) = 1,
and
 R is a relation on OM with the following properties:
1. (8x 2 OM)(8y 2 OM)(xRy _ yRx)
2. (8x 2 OM)(8y 2 OM)(8z 2 OM)(xRy ^ yRz ! xRz)
3. x 2 om(p _ q)! (9y)(9z)(y; z 2 om(p) [ om(q) ^ yRx ^ xRz)
Of course, we write xPy for xRy ^ :yRx. In this model, xPy is valid if x is
`intrinsically better' then y.
Except for this valuation, Danielsson also dened A{valuation which he used for
investigating properties of his Ai and Bi operators (i = 1; 2; : : : ; 6).
1.7 Our intentions
In this work, we are trying to nd some appropriate semantics for von Wright's
logic system, but not in a way Rescher did, but using the following approach:
We assume that states of aairs (arguments of preference relation) behave ac-
cording to the laws of classical propositional logic (we will call it inner logic), as
von Wright remarked in [vW63], and for outer logic, we employ dierent logics:
rst, we use rst degree entailment Efde (relevance logic described in [AB75]), and
after that various other relevance, paraconsistent and many{valued logics, Sugihara
matrix etc. A criteria for choosing outer logic is that it has a matrix (tabular)
interpretation, as we are looking for matrix interpretation for preference relation.
In all those logics, unless otherwise stated, we will look for the interpretation f
of the following type:
f(xPy) =
8><>:
a; if x = 0 and y = 0;
b; if x = 0 and y = 1;
c; if x = 1 and y = 0;
d; if x = 1 and y = 1.
and we try, using computer, to nd values for a, b, c and d, so that this interpretation
retains the most of the preference relation properties.
Except for this approach, we also tried to nd connections between logics of pref-
erence and modal propositional logics, and we investigated properties of preference
relations dened using modal operators.
Chapter 2
In search for semantics
2.1 System of preferences and Efde
2.1.1 Von Wright's preference system
If we denote with P preference relation, we have the following system of axioms for
von Wright's logic of preference (see [vW63] or [KM75]):
(W1) xPy ! :(yPx)
(W2) xPy ^ yPz ! xPz
(W3) xPy $ (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x)
(W4) (x _ y)P (z _ u)$ (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^
:y ^ u) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ u)
(W5) xPy $ (x^)P (y ^)^ (x^:)P (y ^:), where  is a new variable.
2.1.2 Intended interpretation
The rst interpretation we are going to consider is a natural interpretation i.e. a
kind of interpretation that assures us that if x is true and y false, then xPy is true
and yPx is false. So, one way to embed logic system (W1){(W5) into the rst
degree entailment Efde is the following:
f(xPy) =
(
1; if x = 1 and y = 0;
4; if x = 0 and y = 1;
2; otherwise.
where '$  is assumed to mean '  , i.e. '!  and  ! ' (see [AB75]). We
are using characteristic matrices for Efde given by T. J. Smiley ([AB75, pp.162{
163]):
^ 1 2 3 4 _ 1 2 3 4 ! 1 2 3 4 :
1 1 2 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 1 4
2 2 2 4 4 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 4 4 2 2
3 3 4 3 4 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 4 1 4 3 3
4 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 1
where 1 is designated true, and 4 designated false value.
Testing above axioms in this interpretation, we obtained the following results:
{ Axioms (W1), (W2) and (W3) are valid;
{ Axioms (W4) and (W5) are only valid from right to left.
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2.1.3 What is valid?
With the help of the computer program written in LISP and using above tables for
Efde, we obtained validness of the following formulae:
(1) xPy ! :(yPx)
(2) xPy ^ yPz ! xPz
(3) xPy ! (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x)
(4) (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x)! xPy
(5) (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ u) ^ (y ^ :z ^
:u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ u)! (x _ y)P (z _ u)
(6) (x^)P (y ^)^ (x^:)P (y ^:)! xPy, where  is a new variable.
(7) xPy ! (x^)P (y ^)_ (x^:)P (y ^:), where  is a new variable.
(8) xP (y _ z)! xPy ^ xPz
(9) xPy ^ xPz ! xP (y _ z)
(10) (x _ y)Pz ! xPz _ yPz
(11) xPz _ yPz ! (x _ y)Pz
(12) xPz ^ yPz ! (x _ y)Pz
(13) (x ^ y)Pz ! xPz ^ yPz
(14) xPz ^ yPz ! (x ^ y)Pz
(15) (x ^ y)Pz ! xPz _ yPz
(16) xPy ! :yP:x
(17) :yP:x! xPy
(18) xP (y ^ z)! xPy _ xPz
(19) xPy _ xPz ! xP (y ^ z)
(20) xPy ^ xPz ! xP (y ^ z)
(21) :(yPx)! xPy
2.1.4 What is not valid?
The following formulae are invalid in the above{mentioned interpretation:
(o2) Converse of (2): xPz ! xPy ^ yPz.
(o5) Converse of (5): (x_y)P (z_u)! (x^:z^:u)P (:x^:y^z)^(x^:z^
:u)P (:x^:y^u)^(y^:z^:u)P (:x^:y^z)^(y^:z^:u)P (:x^:y^u)
(o6) Converse of (6): xPy ! (x ^ )P (y ^ ) ^ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :), where 
is a new variable.
(o7) Converse of (7): (x ^ )P (y ^ ) _ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :)! xPy, where 
is a new variable.
(o12) Converse of (12): (x _ y)Pz ! xPz ^ yPz.
(o15) Converse of (15): xPz _ yPz ! (x ^ y)Pz.
(o20) Converse of (20): xP (y ^ z)! xPy ^ xPz.
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2.1.5 New system of axioms
Considering the following set of axioms:
(S1) xPy  :(yPx) (formulae (1), (21))
(S2) xPy ^ yPz ! xPz (formula (2))
(S3) xPy  :yP:x (formulae (16), (17))
(S4) (x _ y)Pz  xPz _ yPz (formulae (10), (11))
we are going to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1.1 From axioms (S1){(S4), using axioms and rules of Efde, we can
derive all formulae (1){(21).
2.1.6 Axioms and rules of Efde
To prove theorem 2.1.1, we need axioms and rules for a logical system we are working
in. We will use axiomatization of Efde from [AB75, p.158]. Axioms are:
(E1) A ^B ! A
(E2) A ^B ! B
(E3) A! A _B
(E4) B ! A _B
(E5) A ^ (B _ C)! (A ^B) _ C
(E6) A! ::A
(E7) ::A! A
and inference rules are:
(R1)
` A! B ` B ! C
` A! C
(R2)
` A! B ` A! C
` A! B ^ C
(R3)
` A! C ` B ! C
` A _B ! C
(R4)
` A! B
` :B ! :A
We will also use the following lemma from [AB75, p.159]:
Lemma 2.1.1 The following equivalences are provable in Efde:
(a) A ^B  B ^A (commutativity of ^)
(b) A _B  B _A (commutativity of _)
(c) A ^ (B ^ C) (A ^B) ^ C (associativity of ^)
(d) A _ (B _ C) (A _B) _ C (associativity of _)
(e) A ^ (B _ C) (A ^B) _ (A ^ C) (distributivity of ^ over _)
(f) A _ (B ^ C) (A _B) ^ (A _ C) (distributivity of _ over ^)
(g) :(A ^B) :A _ :B (de Morgan's law for ^)
(h) :(A _B) :A ^ :B (de Morgan's law for _)
(i) If '1  '2 then  (: : : ; '1; : : :)  (: : : ; '2; : : :) (uniform substitution)
12 CHAPTER 2. IN SEARCH FOR SEMANTICS
2.1.7 Dependences between formulae
In sequel, we will write (9); (13) ` (6) for the statement that formula (6) is derivable
from formulae (9) and (13).
Lemma 2.1.2 The following holds:
(a) (12); (9); (4) ` (5);
(b) (6); (1); (21) ` (7);
(c) (13); (9) ` (6);
(d) (11) ` (12);
(e) (19) ` (20);
(f) (13) ` (15);
(g) (10); (13); (16); (17); (18) ` (4).
Proof:
(a)
(x^:z^:u)P (:x^:y^z)^ (x^:z^:u)P (:x^:y^u)^ (y^:z^:u)P (:x^
:y ^ z)^ (y ^:z ^:u)P (:x^:y ^ u)! (x^:(z _ u))P (z ^:(x_ y))^ (x^:(z _
u))P (u ^ :(x _ y)) ^ (y ^ :(z _ u))P (z ^ :(x _ y)) ^ (y ^ :(z _ u))P (u ^ :(x _ y))
(de Morgan's laws)
(x^:(z_u))P (z^:(x_y))^ (x^:(z_u))P (u^:(x_y))^ (y^:(z_u))P (z^
:(x _ y)) ^ (y ^ :(z _ u))P (u ^ :(x _ y))! ((x _ y) ^ :(z _ u))P (z ^ :(x _ y)) ^
((x _ y) ^ :(z _ u))P (u ^ :(x _ y)) (formula (12), distributivity in Efde)
((x _ y) ^ :(z _ u))P (z ^ :(x _ y)) ^ ((x _ y) ^ :(z _ u))P (u ^ :(x _ y)) !
((x _ y) ^ :(z _ u))P ((z _ u) ^ :(x _ y)) (formula (9))
((x _ y) ^ :(z _ u))P ((z _ u) ^ :(x _ y))! (x _ y)P (z _ u) (formula (4))
(x^:z^:u)P (:x^:y^z)^ (x^:z^:u)P (:x^:y^u)^ (y^:z^:u)P (:x^
:y ^ z) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ u)! (x _ y)P (z _ u) (rule (R1) several times)
(b)
(y ^ )P (x ^ ) ^ (y ^ :)P (x ^ :)! yPx (formula (6))
:(yPx)! :((y ^ )P (x ^ )) _ :((y ^ :)P (x ^ :))
(rule (R4) and de Morgan's laws)
xPy ! :(yPx) (formula (1))
:((y^)P (x^))_:((y^:)P (x^:))! (x^)P (y^)_(x^:)P (y^:)
(formulae (1) and (21), substitution)
xPy ! (x ^ )P (y ^ ) _ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :)
(rule (R1) on previous 2 formulae)
(c)
(x ^ )P (y ^ ) ^ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :)! xP (y ^ ) ^ P (y ^ ) ^ xP (y ^ :) ^
:P (y ^ :) (formula (13))
xP (y^)^P (y^)^xP (y^:)^:P (y^:)! xP (y^ (_:))^P (y^
) ^ :P (y ^ :) (formula (9))
xP (y^ (_:))^P (y^)^:P (y^:)! xPy^P (y^)^:P (y^:)
( _ : is a tautology of propositional logic)
xPy ^ P (y ^ ) ^ :P (y ^ :)! xPy (axiom (E1))
(x ^ )P (y ^ ) ^ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :)! xPy (rule (R1) several times)
(d)
xPz ^ yPz ! xPz (axiom (E1))
xPz ! xPz _ yPz (axiom (E3))
xPz _ yPz ! (x _ y)Pz (formula (11))
xPz ^ yPz ! (x _ y)Pz (rule (R1) applied several times)
(e)
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xPy ^ xPz ! xPy (axiom (E1))
xPy ! xPy _ xPz (axiom (E3))
xPy _ xPz ! xP (y ^ z) (formula (19))
xPy ^ xPz ! xP (y ^ z) (rule (R1) applied several times)
(f)
(x ^ y)Pz ! xPz ^ yPz (formula (13))
xPz ^ yPz ! xPz (axiom (E1))
xPz ! xPz _ yPz (axiom (E3))
(x ^ y)Pz ! xPz _ yPz (rule (R1) applied several times)
(g)
(x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x)! xP (y ^ :x) ^ :yP (y ^ :x) (formula (13))
xP (y ^ :x) ^ :yP (y ^ :x)! (xPy _ xP:x) ^ (:yPy _ :yP:x)
(formula (18))
:yP:x xPy (formulae (16), (17))
(xPy _ xP:x) ^ (:yPy _ :yP:x)! (xPy _ xP:x) ^ (:yPy _ xPy)
(substitution)
(xPy _ xP:x) ^ (:yPy _ xPy)! xPy ^ (xP:x _ :yPy) (distributivity)
xPy ^ (xP:x _ :yPy)! xPy (axiom (E1))
(x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x)! xPy (rule (R1) several times)
2
So, we derived formulae (4), (5), (6), (7), (12), (15) and (20). Since formulae
(1) and (21) are in fact axiom (S1), (2) is axiom (S2), (16) and (17) are axiom (S3),
and (10) and (11) are axiom (S4), we only need to derive formulae (3), (8), (9),
(13), (14), (18) and (19).
Lemma 2.1.3 The following holds:
(a) (1); (18); (19); (21) ` (13);
(b) (1); (18); (19); (21) ` (14).
Proof:
(a)
(x ^ y)Pz ! :(zP (x ^ y)) (formula (1))
:(zP (x ^ y))! :(zPx _ zPy) (formula (18), (19), substitution)
:(zPx _ zPy)! :(zPx) ^ :(zPy) (de Morgan's laws)
:(zPx) ^ :(zPy)! xPz ^ yPz (formulae (18), (19))
(x ^ y)Pz ! xPz ^ yPz (rule (R1) several times)
(b)
xPz ^ yPz ! :(zPx) ^ :(zPy) (formula (1))
:(zPx) ^ :(zPy)! :(zPx _ zPy) (de Morgan's laws)
:(zPx _ zPy)! :(zP (x ^ y)) (formulae (18), (19), substitution)
:(zP (x ^ y))! (x ^ y)Pz (formula (21))
xPz ^ yPz ! (x ^ y)Pz (rule (R1) several times)
2
Lemma 2.1.4 The following holds:
(a) (1); (10); (11); (21) ` (9);
(b) (1); (10); (21) ` (8);
(c) (10); (16); (17) ` (18);
(d) (11); (16); (17) ` (19);
(e) (14); (16); (17); (19) ` (3).
14 CHAPTER 2. IN SEARCH FOR SEMANTICS
Proof:
(a)
xPy ^ xPz ! :(yPx) ^ :(zPx) (formulae (1), (21), substitution)
:(yPx) ^ :(zPx)! :(yPx _ zPx) (de Morgan's laws)
:(yPx _ zPx)! :((y _ z)Px) (formulae (10), (11), substitution)
:((y _ z)Px)! xP (y _ z) (formula (21))
xPy ^ xPz ! xP (y _ z) (rule (R1) applied several times)
(b)
xP (y _ z)! :((y _ z)Px) (formula (1))
:((y _ z)Px)! :(yPx _ zPx) (formula (10) and rule (R4))
:(yPx _ zPx)! :(yPx) ^ :(zPx) (de Morgan's laws)
:(yPx) ^ :(zPx)! xPy ^ xPz (formulae (1), (21), substitution)
xP (y _ z)! xPy ^ xPz (rule (R1) several times)
(c)
xP (y ^ z)! :(y ^ z)P:x (formula (16))
:(y ^ z)P:x! (:y _ :z)P:x (de Morgan's laws)
(:y _ :z)P:x! :yP:x _ :zP:x (formula (10))
:yP:x _ :zP:x! xPy _ xPz (formula (17))
xP (y ^ z)! xPy _ xPz (rule (R1) several times)
(d)
xPy _ xPz ! :yP:x _ :zP:x (formula (16)
:yP:x _ :zP:x! (:y _ :z)P:x (formula (11))
(:y _ :z)P:x! :(y ^ z)P:x (de Morgan's laws)
:(y ^ z)P:x! xP (y ^ z) (formula (17))
xPy _ xPz ! xP (y ^ z) (rule (R1) several times)
(e)
xPy ! xPy _ (xP:x ^ :yPy) (axiom (E3))
xPy _ (xP:x ^ :yPy)! (xPy _ :xPx) ^ (xPy _ :yPy)) (distributivity)
(xPy _ :xPx) ^ (xPy _ :yPy)! (xPy _ xP:x) ^ (:yPy _ :yP:x)
(formulae (16), (17))
(xPy _ xP:x) ^ (:yPy _ :yP:x)! xP (y ^ :x) ^ :yP (y ^ :x)
(formula (19))
xP (y ^ :x) ^ :yP (y ^ :x)! (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x) (formula (14))
xPy ! (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x) (rule (R1) several times)
2
Proof of theorem 2.1.1: Follows directly from lemmas 2.1.2{2.1.3, since all for-
mulae are derived from (S1){(S4) 2
2.1.8 Slight modications
The above{presented system is in a way too weak: for instance, the axiom (S3), i.e.
Martin's axiom (M8), is problematic and prone to criticism (see [CS66a],[CS66b]).
To avoid this, we will consider the following interpretation that still belongs to the
above{mentioned class of natural interpretations:
f(xPy) =
8><>:
1; if x = 1 and y = 0;
4; if x = 0 and y = 1;
2; if x = 1 and y = 1;
3; if x = 0 and y = 0.
Slightly modifying the already mentioned LISP program, we were able to show
that the following formulae are not true in this interpretation:
(3) xPy ! (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x)
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(4) (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x)! xPy
(5) (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ u) ^ (y ^ :z ^
:u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ u)! (x _ y)P (z _ u)
(16) xPy ! :yP:x
(17) :yP:x! xPy
and all others from the list (1){(21) are valid.
2.1.9 Dependences in new system
Looking at the proofs of lemmas 2.1.2{2.1.3, we can readily see that the following
theorem is true:
Theorem 2.1.2 In the new system, the following dependences hold:
(a) (6); (1); (21) ` (7);
(b) (13); (9) ` (6);
(c) (1); (10); (11); (21) ` (9);
(d) (11) ` (12);
(e) (19) ` (20);
(f) (13) ` (15);
(g) (1); (10); (21) ` (8);
(h) (1); (18); (19); (21) ` (13);
(i) (1); (18); (19); (21) ` (14).
that is the list of axioms for this system could be:
(S1) xPy  :(yPx) (formulae (1), (21))
(S2) xPy ^ yPz ! xPz (formula (2))
(S3) xP (y ^ z) xPy _ xPz (formulae (18), (19))
(S4) (x _ y)Pz  xPz _ yPz (formulae (10), (11))
because all other formulae can be derived from those.
2.2 Interpretation in Sugihara matrix
2.2.1 Denitions
Following the work of M. Tokarz ([Tok80]), we will dene Sugihara matrix as an
ordered 6{tuple SI = (I; ;^;_;!; D), where (carrier set) I is a chain with respect
to some (xed) ordering , connective   is a unary, bijective involution with the
property that x  y implies y   x, connectives ^ and _ are dened as a minimum
and a maximum of two elements with respect to the ordering , connective ! is
dened as
x! y =
 x _ y ; if x  y;
 x ^ y ; if x > y.
and D = fa 2 I j   a  ag is a set of non{negative elements of I.
We usually choose I = f n; : : : ; 1; 1; : : : ; ng, and in that case1 we will denote
Sugihara matrix with Sn. If it contains 0, we will denote it by S
0
n. For given
matrix SI , we dene a SI{interpretation f :V ar 7! I on propositional variables
which extends in natural way to formulae in the following way:
1Sugihara matrix which does not contain 0 is called normal Sugihara matrix.
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10 If B is a propositional variable, then f(B) 2 I;
20 f(C ^D) = min(f(C); f(D));
30 f(C _D) = max(f(C); f(D));
40 f(:C) =  f(C);
50 f(C ! D) = f(C)! f(D);
We will say that formula ' is valid in SI{interpretation f if f(') 2 D, SI{valid
if it is valid in all SI{interpretations and, nally, valid if it is SI{valid for all SI
(see [AB75], pages 400{401).
One of the well{known results concerning Sugihara matrices is the connection
between relevance logic RM and Sugihara matrix ([AB75]).
2.2.2 Why using Sugihara matrix?
All previous methods of interpretation in Efde have the same shortcoming, i.e. rather
problematic formulae (20) and (21) are valid there. So we will try to circumvent
this problem. First, let us consider the formula (21), that is
:(yPx)! xPy
and let us try to nd what interpretation we need to dispose of its validity.
Theorem 2.2.1 The condition for invalidness of the formula (21) and for validness
of the formula (1) at the same time in some Sugihara matrix is
f(xPy) + f(yPx) < 0:
Proof: Let us denote f(xPy) = p and f(yPx) = q, for some p; q 2 I. Then we
have:
f(xPy ! :(yPx)) =

max( p; q); if p   q;
min( p; q); if p >  q. =





max(p; q); if p   q;
min(p; q); if p <  q.
so (1) will be true and (21) false if for all x and y: f(xPy ! :(yPx))  0 and
f(:(yPx)! xPy) < 0. We have the following cases:
(i) p =  q. In that case, we must have min(p; q)  0 and max(p; q) < 0, and
that is impossible since p and q have opposite signs.
(ii) p >  q. In that case, we must have max(p; q)  0 and max(p; q) < 0, and
that implies that both p and q are negative, which is impossible since p+ q > 0.
(iii) p <  q. In that case, we must have min(p; q)  0 and min(p; q) < 0 | no
contradiction here. This condition is equivalent to p+ q < 0. 2
So, with respect to this theorem, we made another slight modication of our
LISP program, and for interpretation of the preference relation P , we have chosen
the following (fairly arbitrary) one:
f(xPy) =
 max(jxj; y) ; if x  y;
min(x; jyj) ; if x > y.
which satises the condition of the theorem.
We obtained the following results for Sugihara matrix S2 (we will use notation
(1){(21) from page 10):
(a) Valid formulae: (1), (2), (4), (5), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15),
(18) and (20);
(b) Invalid formulae: (3), (6), (7), (8), (16), (17), (19), (21), as well as all
formulae invalid in the previous interpretation.
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2.2.3 Negative results
As we could see, the formula (20) is still valid although it is intuitively false2.
So we tried to nd an interpretation in Sugihara matrix in which (20) is invalid.
Unfortunately, it is not possible because of the following theorem:
Theorem 2.2.2 In all Sugihara matrices SI , no matter what interpretation f is,
formula
xPy ^ xPz ! xP (y ^ z) ()
is valid.
Proof: Let as before, f(xPy) = p, f(xPz) = q, where p; q 2 I. As I is a chain and
x ^ y is dened as min(x; y), we have that min(y; z) 2 fy; zg and, hence, f(xP (y ^
z)) 2 fp; qg. That means that f(xPy ^ xPz) = min(p; q) and f(xP (y ^ z)) 2 fp; qg
and, since min(p; q)  p and min(p; q)  q, we have:
f(()) =

max( min(p; q); p) ; if min(y; z) = y;
max( min(p; q); q) ; otherwise.
Suppose that p  q (otherwise we have symmetrical reasoning). In that case
min(p; q) = q and hence
f(()) =

max( q; p) ; if y  z;
max( q; q) ; if y > z.
If y > z, then f(())  0, since at least one from  q, q must be  0.
If y  z, we have the following two cases:
(a) p  0. In that case f(()) = max( q; p)  p  0.
(b) p < 0. In that case also q < 0, so f(()) = max( q; p)   q > 0.
So, f(()) is always non{negative, and hence formula () is valid. 2
Corollary 2.2.1 The algebraic structure in which (20) is invalid is either not a
chain, or a conjunction is not dened as a minimum of two elements.
2.3 Return to Efde
So, we have seen what can be done using Sugihara matrices, and what can be done
if we are looking for \natural interpretations" for preference relation3 in Efde. But,
the problem with Sugihara matrices is that we do not know what its background
logic is4, so we can not prove lemmas and theorems of dependences as we did
in Efde in previous sections. So, we returned to Efde and wrote another LISP
program which, using `brute force' method, searches for `the best' interpretation for
preference relation P in Efde. We will understand the term `the best' as the one in
which as many acceptable formulae as possible are valid and as few non{acceptable
formulae (i.e. of (16), (17), (20) and (21)) as possible are valid.
2One example is: if x is interpreted as \to win $100", y as \to win $70", and z as \to win $80",
we (usually) do have xPy and xPz but not xP (y ^ z), since y ^ z means \to win $150".
3Natural in the sense that if x = 1 (i.e. true) and y = 0 (i.e. false) then xPy should be true.
4Not strictly true, because we can apply a result from [AB75] and use relevance logic RM.
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2.3.1 Results
We suppose that our interpretation for P is as follows (for a; b; c; d 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g):
f(xPy) =
8><>:
a; if x = 0 and y = 0;
b; if x = 0 and y = 1;
c; if x = 1 and y = 0;
d; if x = 1 and y = 1.
The program checked out all von Wright's axioms, all formulae (1){(21), as well as
all hopefully invalid formulae in all interpretations (there are 44 = 256), and found
out the following results:
(a) If (a; b; c; d) 2 f(2; 4; 4; 4); (3; 4; 3; 4); (3; 4; 4; 4)g, then formulae (16), (17)
and (21) are invalid.
(b) In all under (a) mentioned interpretations, formulae (4) and (5) are
invalid, and in the rst and the third one, formulae (11) and (13) are
also not valid.
(c) Formula (20) is valid in all interpretations!
(d) In all under (a) mentioned interpretations, valid von Wright's axioms are
(W1), (W2) and (W5), whereas axioms (W3) and (W4) are only valid
from left to right (that is, opposite from what we had before!).
(e) In the second under (a) mentioned interpretation, as a consequence we
have xPz_yPz  xPz^yPz, (formulae (12) and (o12) give xPz^yPz 
(x_ y)Pz, and formulae (10) i (11) give (x_ y)Pz  xPz _ yPz), so we
can say that this interpretation is also unacceptable.
By the way, the fact mentioned under (c) can also be proved:
Theorem 2.3.1 In every matrix interpretation of preference relation P of the
above{mentioned type where logical operations between preferences are dened as
in Efde, and operations in preference relation are dened as in classical logic, for-
mula (20) is valid.
Proof: In the same way the theorem 2.2.2 from page 17 was proved since inner
connectives are dened in a classical way, and so y ^ z 2 fy; zg. 2
2.4 Paraconsistent and many{valued logics
A step to paraconsistent and many{valued logics is a rather natural one for further
exploring of preference relations. Many{valued logics have some properties that
are not true in two{valued logics. One of these was demonstrated in article Social
choice and  Lukasiewicz logic ([Ovc91]) by Sergei Ovchinnikov, where the author,
using many{valued  Lukasiewicz logic, constructed a model for collective choice rule
in group preferences that satises the property of unrestricted domain, nondicta-
torship, independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto principle and obtained
a kind of result that Arrow proved that are impossible if we are working in classical
logic (see [Kel78] for more details about Arrow's theorems).
2.4.1 Why paraconsistent logics?
In paraconsistent logics ([PRN89]), deriving contradiction in a logical system does
not mean that any formula is derivable. Namely, we distinguish two concepts: we
say that logic is trivial if it contains all formulae, and that it is contradictory if
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there exists a formula ' so that both ' and :' are contained in that logic. In the
classical case, those two notions have identical meaning, but in the paraconsistent
one they are dierent.
So, why paraconsistent logics? It happens very often that our list of wishes
(preferences) that we put into preference logic is contradictory, and we try to keep
those contradictions local, that is, not to destroy the whole system.
2.4.2 Denitions for many{valued logics
In order to work with matrices for many{valued logics, we need a method to dene
a consequence relation formally. One method is given in [Urq86] on pages 76{77.
Let us assume that we are dealing with a xed language L for propositional
many{valued logic, and that connectives are contained in f^;_;:;!;$g.
A matrix for the language L consists of
{ an abstract algebra A of the appropriate type;
{ a non{empty subset D  A of designated elements;
If v:A 7! 2V ar(L) is an assignment5 of elements of the matrix to propositional
variables, then v can, in the usual way, be extended to formulae.
Let   and  be nite (possibly empty) sets of formulae of L. We say that  is a
consequence of   with respect to matrix M , denoted with   j=M , if the following
holds: for every assignment v of elements of M to variables of L, if v(') 2 D for all
' 2  , then v( ) 2 D for some  2 . Formula ' is a tautology with respect to M
if ; j=M ', which we abbreviate as j=M '.
2.4.3 Testing method
All paraconsistent and/or many{valued logic systems presented bellow have matrix




a; if x = 0 and y = 0;
b; if x = 0 and y = 1;
c; if x = 1 and y = 0;
d; if x = 1 and y = 1.
where a, b, c and d are constants that belong to the language of given logic. We
again modied our LISP program to search for interpretations according to the
given matrix.
2.4.4 System 1
This is a paraconsistent logic dened in [AT75] in 1975. Its matrix is:
^ 0 1 2 _ 0 1 2 ! 0 1 2 :
0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 0
2 2 1 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 2
where 0 and 2 are designated true and 1 a designated false value.
5We can also use a function :V ar(L) 7! A, that is more usual.
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2.4.5 System 2
This system is from [KdC89] and [BR89]. The implication in this system is the
strong one in the sense that ' !  is a theorem only if ' and  share variables.
The matrix below is also a matrix for relevance logic RM3 ([AB75, p.470]).
System 2 is dened in the following way: M = (f1; 2; 3g;!;_;^;:g, where
x ^ y = min(x; y) and x _ y = max(x; y) for x; y 2 f1; 2; 3g, and with the following
matrix for ! and ::
! 1 2 3 :
1 3 3 3 1 3
2 1 2 3 2 2
3 1 1 3 3 1
with 3 and 2 as designated true, and 1 as a designated false value.
Note that if we substitute 1 7!  1, 2 7! 0 and 3 7! 1, we obtain Sugihara matrix
S01 with carrier set I = f 1; 0; 1g and with connectives dened as in section 2.2.1,
page 15.
2.4.6 System 3
These are actually two systems from [Mor89, pp.299 and 301] and from [Car85,
p.367], but, applied to von Wright's preference logic, they give the same result.
Those systems are in paraconsistent logics discussed in order to establish a relation-
ship between classical logic C0 and paraconsistent logics C1, C2, : : : , C! investigated
by da Costa ([dC74],[dCA77]).
The rst system, denoted by C0:1 (or by P 1 in [Car85]) has the following matrix:
^ 1 2 3 _ 1 2 3 ! 1 2 3 :
1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3
2 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 2 1
3 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 1
with 1 and 2 as designated true, and 3 as a designated false value.
The second system, denoted by C0:2, has the following matrix:
^ 1 2 3 _ 1 2 3 ! 1 2 3 :
1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3
2 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 1
with 1 as a designated true, and 2 and 3 as designated false values.
2.4.7 System 4
This system is discussed in [Por84], and it represents  Lukasiewicz's  L{modal system.
Here, we have two kinds of negation: a strong (or a classical) one (:) and a weak
one (). Its matrix is ([Por84], pages 87 and 88):
^ 1 2 3 4 _ 1 2 3 4 ! 1 2 3 4 : 
1 1 2 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 1 4 2
2 2 2 4 4 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 3 3 2 3 1
3 3 4 3 4 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 2 1 2 3 2 2
4 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 3 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 1 1
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with 1 as a designated true value. We will name 4.1 the system with the strong
negation :, and 4.2 the system with the weak negation .
Note that we can obtain system 4 as a direct product of two tables of classical
logic with operations dened componentwise, and substituting (1; 1) 7! 1, (1; 0) 7!
2, (0; 1) 7! 3 and (0; 0) 7! 4 (see [Res69, pp.96{97]).
2.4.8 System 5
This system is discussed in [Mor71] where it was used for checking some axioms of
deontic logic. Some 5 dierent systems were used there for each binary connective,
and we used all of them for our testing, but here we will only present the system
that is mathematically `the most correct6 one', because, for our purpose, those
dierences do not show. Domain is the set f1; 2; : : : ; 6g, and the matrix for negation
and conjunction is:
^ 1 2 3 4 5 6 :
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 6
2 2 2 3 5 5 6 2 5
3 3 3 3 6 6 6 3 4
4 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 3
5 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 1
with disjunction and implication dened in the standard way: x_ y def= :(:x^:y)
and x! y def= :x _ y. A formula is said to be true if its value is  3.
Other systems can be obtained modifying the table for conjunction in the fol-
lowing way:
variant 2: 2 ^ 5 = 5 ^ 2 = 6 (instead of 5);
variant 3: 1 ^ 4 = 4 ^ 1 = 5 (instead of 4);
variant 4: 1 ^ 3 = 3 ^ 1 = 2 (instead of 3), 1 ^ 6 = 6 ^ 1 = 5 (instead of 6),
3 ^ 4 = 4 ^ 3 = 5 (instead of 6) and 4 ^ 6 = 6 ^ 4 = 5 (instead of 6);
variant 5: 1 ^ 2 = 2 ^ 1 = 1 (instead of 2), 1 ^ 5 = 5 ^ 1 = 4 (instead of 5),
2 ^ 4 = 4 ^ 2 = 4 (instead of 5) and 4 ^ 5 = 5 ^ 4 = 4 (instead of 5).
2.5 Results
All those matrices are implemented on computer in order to nd the best interpre-
tations in the following sense:
{ As many axioms as possible should hold;
{ The axioms (W1) and (W2) must be valid;
{ Formulae (16), (17) and (21) should not be valid;
{ As many formulae as possible from the set (1){(21) except from those
mentioned above should be valid;
{ The opposite of (20) should not be valid;
Here is a table with results based on presented criteria:
6In some of them even the associativity of conjunction does not hold.
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System a b c d Invalid axioms Invalid formulae Valid converses
Efde 2 4 1 2 w5,w7 | |
2 4 4 4 w4,w6 4,5,11,13,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
3 4 1 2 w3,w4,w5,w6,w7 3,4,5,16,17 |
3 4 3 4 w4,w6 4,5,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
3 4 4 4 w4,w6 4,5,11,13,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
sugihara { { { { w3,w5,w7 3,6,7,8,16,17,19,21 |
system 1 2 1 0 1 w4,w6 4,5,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
2 1 1 1 w4,w6 4,5,11,13,15,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
2 1 2 1 w4,w6 4,5,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
system 2 1 1 3 2 w3,w5,w7 3,16,17,21 o7
2 1 1 1 w4,w6 4,5,11,13,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
2 1 2 1 w4,w6 4,5,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
2 1 3 1 w4,w5,w6,w7 4,5,16,17,21 |
system 3 2 3 1 3 w4,w6 4,5,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
2 3 2 3 w4,w6 4,5,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
2 3 3 3 w4,w6 4,5,11,13,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
system 4.1 { { { { { { {
system 4.2 2 2 3 4 w4,w5,w6,w7 4,5,11,13,16,17,21 {
2 3 2 4 w4,w5,w6,w7 4,5,8,11,13,16,17,19,21 o12,o15
2 3 4 4 w4,w5,w6,w7 4,5,8,11,13,16,17,19,21 o12,o15
2 4 1 4 w4,w5,w6,w7 4,5,16,17,21 {
2 4 2 4 w4,w6 4,5,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12
2 4 3 4 w4,w5,w6,w7 4,5,11,13,16,17,21 {
2 4 4 4 w4,w6 4,5,11,13,16,17,21 o5,o6,o12,o15
4 2 3 2 w3,w5,w7 3,8,16,17,19,21 o7
4 4 1 2 w3,w5,w7 3,16,17,21 o7
4 4 3 2 w3,w5,w7 3,8,16,17,19,21 o7
Results for the system 5 are not presented in our table, but here they are:
{ There is no interpretation (out of 64 = 1296 dierent) that satises all
conditions;
{ In all interpretations the formula (20) is valid;
{ If we weaken our conditions so that (16) and (17) are allowed to be valid,
then we obtain the following results: if a 2 f4; 5; 6g and b 2 f4; 5; 6g and
c 2 f1; 2; 3g and d 2 f4; 5; 6g, then7:
 In all interpretations mentioned above, from the set of axioms only
(w5) and (w7) are invalid;
 In all interpretations above, all formulae (1){(20) are valid, that is,
only (21) is invalid;
 In all above{mentioned interpretations, from converses, only (o7) is
valid.
Note also that in the system 5 all axioms and rules of Efde are valid.
2.5.1 Remarks about the table of results
{ Labels for formulae in the table have the following meaning:
7Note that this interpretation is the \natural one" in the sense described at the beginning of
section 2.3.
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(w1) is the axiom (W1);
(w2) is the axiom (W2);
(w3) is the axiom (W3) from left to right;
(w4) is the axiom (W3) from right to left;
(w5) is the axiom (W4) from left to right;
(w6) is the axiom (W4) from right to left;
(w7) is the axiom (W5) from left to right;
(w8) is the axiom (W5) from right to left;
{ Label (for instance) (o7) denotes converse of the formula (7), i.e. other
direction of implication in that formula (see section 2.1.4 on page 10).
{ The rst and the third interpretation in Efde are not of the above{
mentioned type, but they are included in the table for the sake of com-
pleteness.
{ The interpretation in Sugihara matrix is also not of the above{mentioned
type, but it is also presented for the sake of completeness.
2.6 Opposite problem
In previous sections, we have seen how axioms and formulae `behave' in various
logic systems: relevance, paraconsistent and many{valued. We can also bring out
the opposite question: is it possible to dene logical connectives in such a way that
all von Wright's axioms are valid but none of the formulae (16), (17), (20) and (21)
is? Of course, all that under the restriction that inner logic is the classical one.
This restriction is seemingly a logical one, as we should expect states of aairs to
`behave' in a natural way.
2.6.1 Denition of interpretations
In the line with those remarks, we will distinguish two kinds of logical connectives:
classical connectives ^, _, :, ! and $ for operations in preferences, and con-
nectives ^P , _P , :P , !P and $P for operations on preferences. With P f we
will denote an interpretation of relation P and will use lower{case Greek letters for
propositional formulae ('; : : :) and upper{case Greek letters for formulae of the
logic of preference (;	; : : :). Furthermore, we will write `preference formula' for
the term `formula of the logic of preference'.
Denition of preference formulae: The set of preference formulae is the small-
est set closed under the following two rules:
(10) If ' and  are propositional formulae, then 'P is a preference formula8.
(20) If  and 	 are preference formulae then :, ^	, _	, ! 	 and $ 	
are preference formulae, too.
Denition of interpretation: For propositional formulae, interpretation f is the
usual one, and for the preference formulae, we have the following cases:
(10) If ' and  are propositional formulae, then f('P ) = f(')P ff( ).
(20) If  and 	 are preference formulae, then:
(a) f(:) = :P f()
8Note that, because of their nature, we usually restrict ' and  to formulae only consisting of
^, _, : and propositional variables.
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(b) f( ^	) = f() ^P f(	)
(c) f( _	) = f() _P f(	)
(d) f(! 	) = f()!P f(	)
(e) f($ 	) = f()$P f(	)
In the rest of this section, we will assume that the interpretation f for preference
relation P is the usual one:
f(xPy) =
8><>:
a; if x = 0 and y = 0;
b; if x = 0 and y = 1;
c; if x = 1 and y = 0;
d; if x = 1 and y = 1.
2.6.2 Results
We examined tables for all formulae, and here are the results:
 Examination of the axiom (W1) gives the following constraints:
a! :a, b! :c, c! :b and d! :d (U{W1)
 Examination of the axiom (W2) gives the following constraints:
a ^ b! b, b ^ c! a, b ^ d! b, c ^ a! c, c ^ b! d, d ^ c! c (U{W2)
 Examination of the axiom (W3) gives the following constraint:
a = d (U{W3)
It is also a corollary to the following theorem:
Theorem 2.6.1 For (W3) i.e. xPy $ (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x) to be valid, f(xPx) =
f(yPy) must hold for all x and y and for all interpretations f .
Proof: Proof is case{based. If x and y are equivalent, then both (x ^ :y) and
(y ^ :x) are false, so the left hand side reduces to f(0P0), and the right hand
side could be either f(0P0) or f(1P1), so we must have f(xPx) = f(yPy) for
(W3) to hold. If x and y are not equivalent, then (easy check) x $ (x ^ :y), and
y $ (y ^ :x), so the formula is always true. 2
However, the following theorem is also true:
Theorem 2.6.2 If for all x and y we have f(xPx) = f(yPy), then formulae (16)
and (17) are also valid, that is
xPy $ :yP:x:
Proof: Similar to the proof of theorem 2.11.1 on page 38, except there are not that
many cases (the fourth case is not needed). 2
So, we have to choose: either we do not have the axiom (W3), or we have both
this axiom and the Martin's axiom (formulae (16), (17)).
This is hardly a surprising result, as we also have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.6.1 The following holds:
(a) (W3) ` (16)
(b) (W3) ` (17)
Proof: Using (W3), we obtain xPy  (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x), and :yP:x  (:y ^
::x)P (:x ^ ::y), that is :yP:x (x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x), and, because implication
is transitive, we nally get xPy  :yP:x. 2
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Corollary 2.6.1 For (W3) to be valid, and (16) and (17) to be invalid, we need at
least one of the conditions:
10 In outer logic, implication should not be transitive;
20 In inner logic, formula x ::x should not be valid.
The rst condition in corollary 2.6.1 is rather an unusual one, and it is not
clear what a logic is without transitive implication, and the second condition is not
acceptable for the von Wright's concept of preference relation.
 Examination of the axiom (W4) gives the following constraints (we present only
nontrivial constraints):
c$ a ^ c, b$ a ^ b, d$ a ^ a (U{W4)
 Examination of the axiom (W5) gives the following constraints:
b$ a ^ b, c$ a ^ c, d$ a ^ d (U{W5)
but the third constraint is not necessary because of (U{W3), and the rst two are
already contained in (U{W4).
 The formula (8) gives the following constraints:
b! a ^ b, d! c ^ d (U{8)
so we can expect that there are models for (W1){(W5) where (8) is invalid. Because
of (U{W4), the rst constraint in (U{8) must hold, so, only the second one could
be a candidate for invalidness of the formula (8). Since (U{W3) implies a = d, the
formula (8) will not be valid if a! c ^ a is invalid.
 The formula (9) gives the following constraints:
a ^ b! b, c ^ d! d. (U{9)
that is, since the rst constraint, because of (U{W4), must be valid, this formula
will not be valid if c ^ d ! d is invalid, i.e. (because of (U{W3)) if c ^ a ! a is
invalid.
So, we proved the following theorem:
Theorem 2.6.3 For the formula (9) to be invalid, we need the formula x ^ y ! x
to be invalid.
 The formula (10) gives the following constraints:
c! a _ c, d! b _ d (U{10)
that is, because of (U{W3), c! a _ c and a! b _ a, and so we immediately have
the following theorem:
Theorem 2.6.4 For invalidness of the formula (10), we need the invalidness of the
formula x! x _ y.
 The formula (11) gives the following constraints:
a _ c! c, d _ b! d (U{11)
that is, because of (U{W3), a _ c! c and a _ b! a, so we can safely expect that
there is an interpretation in which (W1){(W5) are valid and (11) is not.
 The formula (12) gives the following constraints:
a ^ c! c, b ^ d! d (U{12)
so, since a ^ c ! c, because of (U{W4), must be valid, the constraints for the
invalidness of the formula (12) are given in the theorem 2.6.4.
 The formula (13) gives the following constraints:
a! a ^ c, b! b ^ d (U{13)
that is, since (U{W3) reduces the second constraint to b ! b ^ a, which is true
according to (U{W4), the invalidness of the formula (13) is reduced to the invalid-
ness of the formula a! a^ c, and that means that we should expect that there are
models for von Wright's logic where (13) is non valid.
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 The formula (14) gives the following constraints:
a ^ c! a, b ^ d! b (U{14)
that is, since (U{W3) reduces the second constraint to b ^ a! b, which is true ac-
cording to (U{W4), the invalidness of the formula (14) is reduced to the invalidness
of the formula a ^ c! a, and conditions for the invalidness of the formula (14) are
given in the theorem 2.6.3.
 The formula (15) gives the following constraints:
a! a _ c, b! b _ d (U{15)
that is, since (U{W3) reduces the second constraint to b ! b _ a, the constraints
are a ! a _ c and b ! a _ b, and the conditions for the invalidness of the formula
(15) are given in the theorem 2.6.4.
 For the formulae (16) and (17) theorem 2.6.2 shows that they must be valid.
 The formula (18) gives the following constraints:
a! a _ b, c! c _ d (U{18)
that is, since (U{W3) reduces the second constraint to c ! c _ a, the constraints
are a ! a _ b and c ! a _ c, and the conditions for the invalidness of the formula
(18) are given in the theorem 2.6.4.
 The formula (19) gives the following constraints:
a _ b! a, c _ d! c (U{19)
that is, since (U{W3) reduces the second constraint to c _ a! c, the formula (19)
is invalid if both a_ b! a and a_c! c are invalid, and that means that we should
expect that there are models for von Wright's logic where (19) is invalid.
 The formula (20) gives the following constraints:
a ^ b! a, c ^ d! c (U{20)
that is, because of (U{W3), a ^ b ! a and a ^ c ! c. The second constraint is
necessarily true (because of (U{W5)), and that means that the invalidness of (20)
is reduced to the the invalidness of a^ b! a, and the conditions for the invalidness
of (20) are given in the theorem 2.6.3.
 Finally, the formula (21) gives the following constraints:
:a! a, :c! b, :b! c, :d! d (U{21)
and that means, because of (U{W1), that (21) is invalid in interpretations where
b 6= :c or a 6= :a.
To conclude, there are interpretations in all logics where the formulae (8), (11),
(13), (19) and (21) are invalid, and for the other formulae, we need conditions given
in the theorems 2.6.3 and 2.6.4, i.e.:
 Formula (9) is invalid if not ` a ^ c! a in outer logic;
 The formula (10) is invalid if not ` c ! a _ c or if not ` a ! a _ b in outer
logic;
 The formula (12) is invalid if not ` a ^ b! a in outer logic;
 The formula (14) is invalid if not ` a ^ c ! a in outer logic, so (9) and (14)
are either both valid or both invalid;
 The formula (15) is invalid if not ` a ! a _ c or if not ` b ! a _ b in outer
logic;
 The formula (18) is invalid if not ` a ! a _ b or if not ` c ! a _ c in outer
logic, so the formulae (10) and (18) are either both valid or both invalid;
 The formula (20) is invalid if not ` a ^ b ! a in outer logic, so the formulae
(12) and (20) are either both valid or both invalid;
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Of course, the question is if we should go that far, and investigate so weak
logics where the theorems 2.6.3 and 2.6.4 hold. One example of such a logic is
Kleene's 3{valued logicK3 ([Res69]) if we choose only > for a designated true value.
Another example is Linear logic ([Gir87]) if we choose its operator 
 (`tensor') for
a conjunction, O (`par') for a disjunction, and if we interpret our implication ! as
a linear implication (. The big question is if those systems can validate all von
Wright's axioms, so we will not investigate this question any further.
2.7 New interpretations
So, the previous section showed that it is impossible (at least in this way) to ob-
tain an interpretation that fullls all our wishes from the beginning of section 2.5.
Because of that, we established a new goal | to nd interpretations in above{
presented logical systems where all von Wright's axioms are valid. The table in
section 2.7.2 below shows the results of that goal. The notation is as above, but
the table is slightly dierent because there is no column of valid axioms { they
are all valid. Furthermore, concerning converses, we do not consider the formula
(o5), since it is one direction of the axiom (W4) and (o6), since it is one direction
of the axiom (W5). We give only those interpretations where (21) does not hold9
and where converse of (20) does not hold10. In our investigations, we also included
Kleene's 3{valued logic K3 because of the reasons given at the end of section 2.6.2.
2.7.1 Kleene's 3{valued logic
Matrix for the logic K3 is ([Res69, p.34]):
^ > I ? _ > I ? ! > I ? :
> > I ? > > > > > > I ? > ?
I I I ? I > I I I > I I I I
? ? ? ? ? > I ? ? > > > ? >
We are going to consider two systems: kleene 1, with a designated true value >,
and kleene 2, with designated true values > and I.
Actually, except for all those systems, we also considered two further variants
of Kleene's logic described in [MD90]. Both are dened on the same domain as the
original system, conjunction, disjunction and negation are as in K3, the dierence
is only in implication. The rst system is a system of Przymusinski, and the second
one is their own (i.e. Matheieu{Delahaye). Tables for implication are as follows
([MD90, p.388]):
! > ? I
> > ? ?
? > > >
I > ? >
! > ? I
> > ? ?
? > > >
I > > >
But those systems do not make any dierence for our purposes, so we did not
want to include them in our table (the table is already big enough!). Also, 3{valued
logics of S lupecki and Sobocinski ([BB92, pp.76{77]) did not change the general
picture.
9The reason why we try to avoid (21) is that if it is valid, then we are not able to dene an
indierence relation as xIy $ :(xPy) ^ :(yPx).
10Having to admit (20) is bad enough, but having both implications is even worse.
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2.7.2 Results
So, the new results are:
System a b c d Invalid formulae Valid converses
Efde 2 4 2 2 21 {
2 4 4 2 8,11,13,19,21 {
3 4 3 3 21 {
3 4 4 3 8,11,13,19,21 {
system 1 2 1 1 2 8,11,13,19,21 {
2 1 2 2 21 {
system 2 2 1 1 2 8,11,13,19,21 {
2 1 2 2 21 {
system 3 2 3 2 2 21 {
2 3 3 2 8,11,13,19,21 {
system 4.1 { { { { { {
system 4.2 2 4 2 2 21 {
2 4 4 2 8,11,13,19,21 {
system 5 { { { { { {
kleene 1 { { { { { {
kleene 2 I I > ? 21 o7,o12,o15
I ? > ? 21 o7,o12,o15
2.7.3 Von Wright's extended system
We will call von Wright's extended system one that is given in [vW72] with axiom
(W20) xPy ! xPz _ zPy
instead of the axiom (W2). As already mentioned, from this axiom we can derive
(W2), and in the extended system an indierence relation satises all conditions for
the strong indierence relation in [vW63].
The natural question is: what is the behavior of extended system in the above{
mentioned interpretations? Checking it out, we get some very interesting results:
Namely, the formula (W20) is only valid in those models where all formulae except
(21) are valid. In other models, it is not valid.
So, we can conjecture that there is a connection between the formula (W20) and
(at least one of) the formulae (8), (11), (13) and (19).
2.8 Indierence relation
2.8.1 Denitions
We are going to include indierence relation into our investigations. Von Wright
([vW63]) distinguishes two dierent indierence relations:
{ the weak one, I, dened by xIy $ :(xPy) ^ :(yPx)
{ the strong one E. We say that xEy if and only if under no circumstances
is state x ^ :y preferred to y ^ :x nor vice versa. According to Huber
([Hub72]), the relation E is dened by:
xEy $ :((x ^ :y)P (y ^ :x)) ^ :((y ^ :x)P (x ^ :y))
but it seems that it is not what von Wright had in mind.
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2.8.2 Weak indierence relation
The main properties of this relation are (see [vW63],[vW72] or [Hub72]):
(i1) xIx
(i2) xIy ! yIx
(i3) xIy ^ yIz ! xIz11
Checking out the formulae (i1){(i3) in our models of von Wright's logic (i.e. in
Efde, system 1{3, system 4.2 and kleene 2), we get the following results:
System a b c d Valid formulae
Efde 2 4 2 2 i1,i2,i3
2 4 4 2 i1,i2
3 4 3 3 i1,i2,i3
3 4 4 3 i1,i2
system 1 2 1 1 2 i1,i2,i3
2 1 2 2 i1,i2,i3
system 2 2 1 1 2 i1,i2
2 1 2 2 i1,i2,i3
system 3 2 3 2 2 i1,i2,i3
2 3 3 2 i1,i2,i3
system 4.2 2 4 2 2 i1,i2,i3
2 4 4 2 i1,i2,i3
kleene 2 I I > ? i1,i2,i3
I ? > ? i1,i2,i3
2.8.3 Strong indierence relation
Contrary to the weak indierence relation, which was dened by means of the
preference relation P , the strong indierence relation has to be considered as an
independent relation. Of course, because of principles (e1) and (e2) below, it is not
completely independent, at least not in interpretations we are considering. Accord-
ing to von Wright, this relation should be an equivalence relation, should satisfy the
axioms (W2){(W5) (with E instead of P ) as well as the following two principles:
(e1) xPy ^ xEz ! zPy
(e2) xPy ^ yEz ! xPz
As already said, if we drop the axiom (W2) and add xPy ! xPz_ zPy instead,
as von Wright did in his extended system ([vW72]), then the weak indierence
relation also satises (e1) and (e2) what otherwise is not the case.
The table of results for strong indierence relation is as follows (we only present
those interpretations where all above{presented constraints hold):
11Formally, the transitivity is not necessary, but we will consider it to restrict the class of models
we are exploring.
30 CHAPTER 2. IN SEARCH FOR SEMANTICS
System Preference a b c d
Efde 2 4 2 2 or 2 4 4 2 1 3 3 1
1 4 4 1
2 4 4 2
3 3 3 3
3 4 4 3
3 4 3 3 or 3 4 4 3 1 2 2 1
1 4 4 1
2 2 2 2
2 4 4 2
3 4 4 3
system 1 2 1 1 2 or 2 1 2 2 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 2
2 1 1 0
2 1 1 2
system 2 2 1 1 2 or 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2
3 1 1 3
system 3 2 3 2 2 or 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 1
1 3 3 2
2 3 3 1
3 3 3 2
system 4.2 2 4 2 2 or 2 4 4 2 1 3 3 1
1 4 4 1
The system kleene 2 is not included in the table because there are too many
interpretations for the relation E (exactly 2 2 3 2 = 24), but, basically, the results
are as follows: for both interpretations for P , we have the same results: a 2 f>; Ig,
b 2 fI;?g, c 2 f>; I;?g and d 2 f>; Ig.
For the above{presented table we only considered the interpretations where all
von Wright's axioms were valid, and for the relation E, we were considering inter-
pretations of the following type:
f(xEy) =
8><>:
a; if x = 0 and y = 0;
b; if x = 0 and y = 1;
c; if x = 1 and y = 0;
d; if x = 1 and y = 1.
2.9 Further investigations
Since all logical systems give, more or less, the same results, in the sequel we will
explore only two (or three) dierent systems. One of them is the system 2 (dened
in section 2.4.5 on page 20) with interpretation:
xPy =
8><>:
2; if x = 0 and y = 0;
1; if x = 0 and y = 1;
2; if x = 1 and y = 0;
2; if x = 1 and y = 1.
and xEy =
8><>:
3; if x = 0 and y = 0;
1; if x = 0 and y = 1;
1; if x = 1 and y = 0;
3; if x = 1 and y = 1.
There are several reasons for that, but the most important are:
 This system has a well{known and (in [AB75]) well{developed logic;
 Interpretation of the preference relation is the `natural' one;
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 The axioms of Efde are valid in this logic (actually, Efde is its subsystem), so
we can use (with slight modications) all proofs from section 2.1.7 on page
12.
Note that, although the formula (W20) is valid in this interpretation, we still
have two dierent indierence relations. The reason for that is that for proving (e1)
and (e2), except for the formula (W20) and denition of the indierence relation,
we also need a tautology (x_y)^:y $ x^:y, which is not true in this logic. That
means that I and E are dierent in this system.
A logic `behind' the system 2 is the relevance logic RM3.
2.9.1 Denition of relevance logic RM3
The relevance logic RM3 is described in [AB75], and its axioms are ([AB75, pp.231{
232,470]):
(A1) ((A! A)! B)! B
(A2) (A! B)! ((B ! C)! (A! C))
(A3) (A! (A! B))! (A! B)
(A4) A ^B ! A
(A5) A ^B ! B
(A6) (A! B) ^ (A! C)! (A! B ^ C)
(A7) A ^B ! (A ^B)
(A8) A! A _B
(A9) B ! A _B
(A10) (A! C) ^ (B ! C)! (A _B ! C)
(A11) A ^ (B _ C)! (A ^B) _ C
(A12) (A! :A)! :A
(A13) (A! :B)! (B ! :A)
(A14) ::A! A
(A15) A (:A! A)
(A16) A! ((A! B)! B)
(A17) A _ (A! B)
and inference rules are:
(r1)
` A ` B
` A ^B
(MP)
` A ` A! B
` B
In the list of axioms, the axioms (A1){(A14) are the axioms of a relevance
logic E, and the modal operator of necessity  in the axiom (A7) is dened as
A def= (A! A)! A.
Because of the axiom (A2) and of the modus ponens (i.e. the rule (MP)), the
rule (R1) of logic Efde (transitivity of implication) is valid here, because of (A6) the
rule (R2) of Efde is also valid, because of (A10) the rule (R3) of Efde is also valid
and because of the axiom (A13) the rule (R4) of Efde is also valid in RM3. So, we
can safely use proofs of the lemmas 2.1.2{2.1.3 on pages 12{13 in this system.
32 CHAPTER 2. IN SEARCH FOR SEMANTICS
2.9.2 Dependences between formulae in RM3
With respect to the above{mentioned remarks we can immediately state the follow-
ing lemmas. We will use the same notation as before.
Lemma 2.9.1 The following is true:
(a) (12); (9); (4) ` (5);
(b) (13); (9) ` (6);
(c) (11) ` (12);
(d) (19) ` (20);
(e) (13) ` (15);
(f) (10); (13); (16); (17); (18) ` (4).
Proof:
(a) The same as the proof of lemma 2.1.2 (a) on page 12.
(b) The same as the proof of lemma 2.1.2 (c) on page 12.
(c) The same as the proof of lemma 2.1.2 (d) on page 12.
(d) The same as the proof of lemma 2.1.2 (e) on page 12.
(e) The same as the proof of lemma 2.1.2 (f) on page 13.
(f) The same as the proof of lemma 2.1.2 (g) on page 13.
Lemma 2.9.2 The following is true:
(a) (10); (16); (17) ` (18);
(b) (11); (16); (17) ` (19);
(c) (14); (16); (17); (19) ` (3).
Proof:
(a) The same as the proof of lemma 2.1.4 (c) on page 14.
(b) The same as the proof of lemma 2.1.4 (d) on page 14.
(c) The same as the proof of lemma 2.1.4 (e) on page 14.
Lemma 2.9.3 The following is true:
(a) (w7) ` (7)
(b) (8); (16); (17) ` (13)
(c) (9); (16); (17) ` (14)
Proof:
(a)
xPy ! (x ^ )P (y ^ ) ^ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :) (formula (w7))
(x ^ )P (y ^ ) ^ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :)! (x ^ )P (y ^ ) (axiom (A4))
(x ^ )P (y ^ )! (x ^ )P (y ^ ) _ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :) (axiom (A8))
xPy ! (x ^ )P (y ^ ) _ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :) (transitivity of implication)
(b)
(x ^ y)Pz ! :zP:(x ^ y) (formula (16))
:zP:(x ^ y)! :zP (:x _ :y) (de Morgan's laws)
:zP (:x _ :y)! :zP:x ^ :zP:y (formula (8))
:zP:x ^ :zP:y ! xPz ^ yPz (formula (17))
(x ^ y)Pz ! xPz ^ yPz (transitivity of implication)
(c)
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xPz ^ yPz ! :zP:x ^ :zP:y (formula (16))
:zP:x ^ :zP:y ! :zP (:x _ :y) (formula (9))
:zP (:x _ :y)! :zP:(x ^ y) (de Morgan's laws)
:zP:(x ^ y)! (x ^ y)Pz (formula (17))
xPz ^ yPz ! (x ^ y)Pz (transitivity of implication)
2
So, the list of formulae we are left with is:
xPy ! :(yPx) (w1)
xPy ^ yPz ! xPz (w2)
(x_ y)P (z _ u)! (x^:z ^:u)P (:x^:y ^ z)^ (x^:z ^:u)P (:x^:y ^ u)^
(y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ u) (w5)
xPy ! (x ^ )P (y ^ ) ^ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :), where  is a new variable (w7)
xP (y _ z) xPy ^ xPz (8), (9)
(x _ y)Pz  xPz _ yPz (10), (11)
xPy  :yP:x (16), (17)
Alternatively, we can make an axiomatization which contains all von Wright's
original axioms. For this case, we will need the following lemma:
Lemma 2.9.4 The following is true:
(a) (W3) ` (16); (17);
(b) (W4) ` (W3).
Proof:
(a) The same as the proof of lemma 2.6.1 on page 24.
(b) If we substitute x = y and z = u in (W4), we obtain our result using laws
of propositional logic (see also [KM75]). 2
Hence, in that case the axiomatization will be (not necessarily the minimal one):
(W 1) xPy ! :(yPx)
(W 2) xPy ^ yPz ! xPz
(W 3) (x _ y)P (z _ u) (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^
:y ^ u) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ u)
(W 4) xPy  (x ^ )P (y ^ ) ^ (x ^ :)P (y ^ :), where  is a new variable
(W 5) xP (y _ z) xPy ^ xPz
(W 6) (x _ y)Pz  xPz _ yPz
We can also note that the formulae (8) and (9) (i.e. (W 5)) are in a way deriva-
tions of (W3) and (W4). Indeed, using (W3) we get:
xP (y _ z) (x ^ (:y ^ :z))P ((y ^ :x) _ (z ^ :x))
whereas (W4) gives:
xP (y _ z) (x ^ (:y ^ :z))P (y ^ :x) ^ (x ^ (:y ^ :z))P (z ^ :x)
and using transitivity we nally get:
(x ^ (:y ^ :z))P ((y ^ :x) _ (z ^ :x))
(x ^ (:y ^ :z))P (y ^ :x) ^ (x ^ (:y ^ :z))P (z ^ :x).
2.10 Alternative system
During our search for admissible interpretations, we obtained two dierent classes
of models: one where from the formulae (1){(21) only (21) is invalid and which is
represented by the relevance logic RM3, and the other one where the formulae (8),
(11), (13) and (19) are invalid, too. This class of models cannot be obtained in the
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logic RM3 because the axiom that the weak indierence relation is transitive is not
fullled there. One system that gives a model that is in that class is the system 1
(described in section 2.4.4 on page 19) with interpretation:
xPy =
8><>:
2; if x = 0 and y = 0;
1; if x = 0 and y = 1;
1; if x = 1 and y = 0;
2; if x = 1 and y = 1.
and xEy =
8><>:
0; if x = 0 and y = 0;
1; if x = 0 and y = 1;
1; if x = 1 and y = 0;
0; if x = 1 and y = 1.
This logic is described in [AT75].
2.10.1 Denition of the system 1
A logic behind the system 1 is a paraconsistent logic L. In this logic, we distinguish
two kinds of variables: A{variables (A1; A2; : : :) for variables that take values 0
and 1, and B{variables (B1; B2; : : :) for variables that take only the value 2. We
will write A1;A2; : : : for formulae that take only values 0 and 1 and B1;B2; : : : for
formulae that take all 3 values.
We dene B{formulae in the following way:
10 All variables are B{formulae;
20 If B1 and B2 are B{formulae, then B1 ! B2, B1 ^ B2, B1 _ B2 and :B1
are also B{formulae.
A{formulae are dened in the following way:
10 All A{variables are A{formulae;
20 Formulae A1 ! A2, A1^A2, A1_A2, :A1, B1 ! A1 and A1 ! (A1_B1)
are A{formulae;
30 If A1 and A2 are A{formulae and B1 arbitrary formula, then A1 ! A2,
A1^A2, A1_A2, :A1, B1 ! A1 and A1 ! A1_B1 are also A{formulae;
40 If :B1 is an A{formula, then B1 is an A{formula;
50 Formulae :A1 ! (A1 ! B1) i :A1 ! :(A1 ^ B1) are A{formulae;
60 Theorems obtained from A{formulae using only modus ponens are also
A{formulae.
Axioms of the logic L are listed below ([AT75, p.21]):
(L1) B1 ! (B2 ! B1)
(L2) (B1 ! (B2 ! B3))! ((B1 ! B2)! (B1 ! B3))
(L3) :A1 ! (A1 ! B1)
(L4) :A1 ! :(A1 ^ B1)
(L5) (B1 ! B2)! ((:B1 ! B2)! B2)
(L6) B1 ! (:B2 ! :(B1 ! B2))
(L7) B1 ! (B2 ! B1 ^ B2)
(L8) B1 ! ::B1
(L9) ::B1 ! B1
(L10) B1 ^ B2 ! B1
(L11) B1 ^ B2 ! B2
(L12) B1 ! B1 _ B2
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(L13) B2 ! B1 _ B2
(L14) :B1 _ :B2 ! :(B1 ^ B2)
(L15) :B1 ^ :B2 ! :(B1 _ B2)
(L16) :(B1 ! B2)! B1 ^ :B2
(L17) :Bi ^Bi
and a inference rule is
(MP)
` B1 ` B1 ! B2
` B2 .
To prove some dependence results, we will need the following lemma:
Lemma 2.10.1 In the logic L implication is transitive, that is:
'1 ! '2; '2 ! '3 ` '1 ! '3
Proof:
(1) ('2 ! '3)! ('1 ! ('2 ! '3)) (axiom (L1))
(2) '2 ! '3 (hypothesis)
(3) '1 ! ('2 ! '3) ((MP) on (1) and (2))
(4) ('1 ! ('2 ! '3))! (('1 ! '2)! ('1 ! '3)) (axiom (L2))
(5) ('1 ! '2)! ('1 ! '3) ((MP) on (3) and (4))
(6) '1 ! '2 (hypothesis)
(7) '1 ! '3 ((MP) on (5) and (6))
2
2.10.2 Another system
Another system with desired properties is the system 3 presented in section 2.4.6
on page 20 and described in [Mor89]. In that system, the interpretation is given by:
xPy =
8><>:
2; if x = 0 and y = 0;
3; if x = 0 and y = 1;
3; if x = 1 and y = 0;
2; if x = 1 and y = 1.
and xEy =
8><>:
1; if x = 0 and y = 0;
3; if x = 0 and y = 1;
3; if x = 1 and y = 0;
1; if x = 1 and y = 1.
An axiomatization of the logic C0:1 of this system (the logic C0:2 is not suitable
since the formula :(xPx) is invalid there) contains axioms (C1){(C12) of a para-
consistent logic C1, together with axioms (C13){(C16). We will use a shorthand A0
for :(A ^ :A). Axioms are:
(C1) A! (B ! A)
(C2) (A! B)! ((A! (B ! C))! (A! C))
(C3) A ^B ! A
(C4) A ^B ! B
(C5) A! (B ! A ^B)
(C6) A! A _B
(C7) B ! A _B
(C8) (A! C)! ((B ! C)! (A _B ! C))
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(C9) A _ :A
(C10) ::A! A
(C11) B0 ! ((A! B)! ((A! :B)! :A))





and inference rules are (MP) and uniform substitution.
If we note that the axioms (C1) and (L1) are the same and that the axioms (C2)
and (L2) are very similar, and because it is all we needed in the previous proof, we
have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.10.2 In the logic C0:1 implication is transitive, i.e.:
'1 ! '2; '2 ! '3 ` '1 ! '3
Proof:
(1) ('2 ! '3)! ('1 ! ('2 ! '3)) (axiom (C1))
(2) '2 ! '3 (hypothesis)
(3) '1 ! ('2 ! '3) ((MP) on (1) and (2))
(4) ('1 ! '2)! (('1 ! ('2 ! '3))! ('1 ! '3)) (axiom (C2))
(5) '1 ! '2 (hypothesis)
(6) ('1 ! ('2 ! '3))! ('1 ! '3) ((MP) on (4) and (5))
(7) '1 ! '3 ((MP) on (3) and (6))
2
2.10.3 Dependences between formulae in those systems
In those systems we have the validness of all the axioms (W1){(W5) as well as the
validness of the formulae (7), (9), (10), (12), (14){(18) and (20).
If we analyze proofs of lemmas of dependences and if we use the above{proved
fact that the implication is transitive, we can readily state the following lemma:
Lemma 2.10.3 In the systems L and C0:1 the following is true:
(a) (W4) ` (W3);
(b) (W5) ` (7);
(c) (9); (16); (17) ` (14);
(d) (W3) ` (16); (17);
(e) (10); (16); (17) ` (18);
(f) (12); (16); (17) ` (20).
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Proof:
(a) Same as the proof of lemma 2.9.4 (b) on page 33.
(b) Same as the proof of lemma 2.9.3 (a) on page 32.
(c) Same as the proof of lemma 2.9.3 (c) on page 32.
(d) Same as the proof of lemma 2.9.4 (a) on page 33.
(e) Same as the proof of lemma 2.1.4 (c) on page 14.
(f)
xPy ^ xPz ! :yP:x ^ :zP:x (formula (16))
:yP:x ^ :zP:x! (:y _ :z)P:x (formula (12))
(:y _ :z)P:x! :(y ^ z)P:x (de Morgan's laws)
:(y ^ z)P:x! xP (y ^ z) (formula (17))
xPy ^ xPz ! xP (y ^ z) (transitivity of implication)
2
After that, we are left with the following formulae:
(W 1) xPy ! :(yPx)
(W 2) xPy ^ yPz ! xPz
(W 3) (x _ y)P (z _ u) (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (x ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^
:y ^ u) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ z) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u)P (:x ^ :y ^ u)
(W 4) xPy  (x^)P (y ^)^ (x^:)P (y ^:), where  is a new variable.
(W 5) xPy ^ xPz ! xP (y _ z)
(W 6) (x _ y)Pz ! xPz _ yPz
(W 7) xPz ^ yPz ! (x _ y)Pz
(W 8) (x ^ y)Pz ! xPz _ yPz
2.11 Slightly misbehaving
All above{presented interpretation methods were based on the fact that the inner
logic is a classical, binary one. We can also look at the problem from a dierent
point of view, as Huber did in his dissertation ([Hub72]). Namely, for a xed
preference formula , let m be the number of variables in , and dene a mapping
k(m):N 7! N as
k(m) =
(
3; if m = 1;
m; if m > 1 and odd;
m+ 1; otherwise.
He assigns positive values to variables using a function v:V ar 7! f1; 2; : : : ; k(m)g
and expands it to propositional formulae: v(x^y) = min(x; y), v(x_y) = max(x; y),
and v(:x) = k(m) + 1   x. Finally, he denes a function  that maps preference
and indierence relations to a set f>;?g in the following way:
(xPy) =
>; if v(x) > v(y);
?; if v(x)  v(y)
and
(xIy) =
>; if v(x) = v(y);
?; if v(x) 6= v(y)
The outer logic in his case is the classical one.
In this interpretation, as Huber showed, all von Wright's axioms, except (w5)
and (w7), are valid (of course, Huber used this interpretation to investigate his own
preference logic and this result is just a corollary).
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We will try the similar approach with the dierence that the outer logic is not
the classical one, but one of the above{presented. We also have to change slightly
his denition of the interpretation  . We will use the following one:
(xPy) =
8<: a; if v(x) = v(y);b; if v(x) > v(y);
c; if v(x) < v(y).
where a, b and c are constants that are to be found. We will only consider models
where all von Wright's axioms are valid.
2.11.1 Results
Unfortunately, results are not very spectacular. The table for all systems, except
the system 5 is as follows:
System a b c Invalid formulae Invalid converses
Efde 2 2 2 21 {
3 3 3 21 {
4 4 4 21 {
system 1 1 1 1 21 {
2 2 2 21 {
system 2 1 1 1 21 {
2 2 2 21 {
system 3 2 2 2 21 {
3 3 3 21 {
system 4.1 4 4 4 21 {
system 4.2 2 2 2 21 {
4 4 4 21 {
and for the system 5 we have: if a; b; c 2 f4; 5; 6g, then all axioms, all formulae
(except (21)) and all converses are valid.
In other words, the interpretation becomes a trivial one and we do not get all12
we are looking for.
2.11.2 Another Efde{model
Of course, another question is what will happen if we choose Efde for our inner logic
as well. For that case we ran our program with interpretation13
xPy =
8><>:
a; if x = y;
b; if x < y (in Efde sense);
c; if x > y (in Efde sense);
d; otherwise.
and found out that in all these interpretations the formulae (16), (17) and (20) are
valid. This can also be viewed as a consequence of the following theorem:
Theorem 2.11.1 The formulae (16) and (17) are valid in all interpretations of
above{mentioned type, no matter what values a, b, c and d take.
Proof: The proof is case{based:
12Actually, we get more, and that is the problem.
13We will say that x < y in Efde sense if implication x! y is true in Efde.
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(i) (x = y) In that case f(xPy) = f(:yP:x) = a, so the formulae are valid.
(ii) (x < y in Efde sense) Using Efde tables, we can easily see that the formula
x < y  :y < :x is true, and so we have that f(xPy) = f(:yP:x) = b,
which implies that our formulae are valid.
(iii) (y < x in Efde sense) The same as in previous case.
(iv) (x and y are incompatible in Efde sense) It is only possible if x = 2,
y = 3 or if x = 3, y = 2. But then we also have that x = :x and y = :y,
so the formulae are again valid. 2
As we already know, this result is not very surprising. If we search for models
for all von Wright's axioms, we get the following results:
System a b c d Invalid formulae Invalid converses
Efde 2 2 2 2 { {
3 3 3 3 { {
4 4 4 4 21 {
In general case, exploring all interpretations will be very complicated and long{
time job even with the help of computer as there are 416 = 4294967296  4:3  109
dierent models.
Chapter 3
Logic of preference and
modal logics
If we take a closer look at the denitions (D1) and (D2) from page 6 which von
Wright gave in [vW72], we can hope that modal logics can be useful for describing
the preference relation. Namely, the denition (D2) says:
We say that s is preferred to t under circumstances Ci if and only if some
Ci{world that is also a s{world is preferred to some Ci{world that is
also a t{world, but no Ci{world that is also a t{world is preferred to
any Ci{world that is also a s{world.
Furthermore, Hallden's system from section 1.3 on page 5 has an axiom (x$
y)! xEy, and since formula :(xEy)! xPy_ yPx is valid, a simple manipulation
of Hallden's axiom shows us that the following denition does make sense.
3.1 Denition of interpretations
Denition: The modal interpretation of preference relation, denoted by P, is
dened as:
xPy $ (x ^ :y) ^ :(y ^ :x)
The immediate result of this denition is a Kripke satisability relation . We
can dene a Kripke model as (X;R; v), where X 6= ; is a set of possible worlds,
R  X2 is an accessibility relation and v : X  V ar 7! f>;?g is an assignment of
truth values to atomic formulae at possible worlds. Following the denition of P,
we immediately have:
w  xPy i (9w1)(wRw1 ^ w1  x ^ :y) ^ (8w2)(wRw2 ! w2 6 y ^ :x)
where for formulae that does not contain preference relation, the satisability is
dened in a usual way. Since we do not want to specify modal logic, we will say
nothing more about relation R.
3.1.1 Properties
From the denition of P, we readily have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1.1 For P, we have:
(a)  xPy ! :(yPx);
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(b) 6 :(yPx)! xPy (formula (21));
(c)  xPy ^ yPz ! xPz;
(d) 6 xPz ! xPy ^ yPz (formula (o2));
(e)  xPy $ (x ^ :y)P(y ^ :x);
(f)  xPy $ :yP:x.
Proof:
(a) As we have :(yPx)$ :(y ^ :x) _ (x ^ :y), the formula is reduced to
(x ^ :y) ^ :(y ^ :x)! :(y ^ :x) _ (x ^ :y)
which is obviously valid, and that proves (a).
(b) Follows directly from the proof under (a).
(c) In that case, the formula is reduced to:
(x ^ :y) ^ :(y ^ :x) ^ (y ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :y)! (x ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :x)
This implication is false if antecedent is true and consequent false. That means
that (x^:y) and (y ^:z) are both true and that both (y ^:x) and (z ^:y)
are false. Furthermore, (x^:z) could not be false, since in that case we will have a
contradiction as at least one of x^:y, y^:z must be true in some world. Indeed, if
for a world w1 we have v(w1; x) = >, v(w1; y) = ?, then we must have v(w1; z) = ?
and that means that v(w1; x ^ :z) = >, what is a contradiction, and if for a world
w2 we have v(w2; y) = >, v(w2; z) = ?, then we must have v(w2; x) = > and that
implies again that v(w2; x ^ :z) = >.
So, (x ^ :z) is true, and for consequent to be false we must force (z ^ :x)
to be true, and that means that in a world w3 we have v(w3; z) = >, v(w3; x) = ?
and that is again a contradiction since both (y ^ :x) and (z ^ :y) are false.
That proves that our formula is valid and thus (c) is proved.
(d) In this case we have to prove that the converse of the formula of the proof
of (c) is false:
(x ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :x)! (x ^ :y) ^ :(y ^ :x) ^ (y ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :y)
One counter{model for this formula could be: (fw1; w2g; ((w1; w2)); v), where
v(w1; x) = v(w2; x) = >, v(w1; y) = v(w2; y) = v(w1; z) = v(w2; z) = ?.
(e) The proof is straightforward and follows directly from the denition of P.
(f) Follows directly from the denition of P and the fact that x$ ::x.
2
In a similar way, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1.2 For P, we have:
(a)  (x ^ )P(y ^ ) ^ (x ^ :)P(y ^ :) ! xPy, where  is a new
variable;
(b) 6 xPy ! (x ^ )P(y ^ ) ^ (x ^ :)P(y ^ :), where  is a new
variable (formula (o6));
(c)  (x^:z^:u)P(:x^:y^z)^(x^:z^:u)P(:x^:y^u)^(y^:z^
:u)P(:x^:y^ z)^ (y^:z^:u)P(:x^:y^u)! (x_y)P(z_u);
(d) 6 (x_y)P(z_u)! (x^:z^:u)P(:x^:y^z)^(x^:z^:u)P(:x^
:y ^ u)^ (y ^:z ^:u)P(:x^:y ^ z)^ (y ^:z ^:u)P(:x^:y ^ u)
(formula (o5));
Proof:
(a) After applying the denition, this formula is reduced to:
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(x^^:y)^:(y^^:x)^(x^:^:y)^:(y^:^:x)! (x^:y)^:(y^:x)
Let us prove this implication. The method is similar to the method used in
the previous theorem. If we suppose that the implication is not true, we get that
formula (y ^ :x) must be false (because both (y ^  ^ :x) and (y ^ : ^ :x)
are false, so formula (x ^ :y) must also be false). But in that case formulae
(x ^  ^ :y) and (x ^ : ^ :y) could not both be true, what is needed for the
implication to be false. So, we obtained a contradiction, and that means that the
implication is true.
(b) Follows directly from the proof in (a). It is easy to construct a counter{
model for this formula.
(c) Reducing the formula to a modal formula and using (x _ y)$ x _ y as
well as a distributivity property, we only need to prove the following formula:
(x ^ :z ^ :u) ^ (y ^ :z ^ :u) ^ :(z ^ :x ^ :y) ^ :(u ^ :x ^ :y) !
((x ^ :z ^ :u) ^ :(z ^ :x ^ :y) ^ :(u ^ :x ^ :y)) _ ((y ^ :z ^ :u) ^ :(z ^
:x ^ :y) ^ :(u ^ :x ^ :y))
and this is further reduced to the proof of the following formula of a propositional
logic:
a ^ b ^ c ^ d! (a ^ c ^ d) _ (b ^ c ^ d)
which is obviously true. That proves the implication.
(d) Follows directly from the proof under (c), if we look at the modal translation
of this formula. 2
Checking other properties of relation P, we immediately have the following
theorem:
Theorem 3.1.3 For P, we have:
(a)  xPy ! (x ^ )P(y ^ ) _ (x ^ :)P(y ^ :), where  is a new
variable (formula (7));
(b)  xP(y _ z)! xPy ^ xPz (formula (8));
(c) 6 xPy ^ xPz ! xP(y _ z) (formula (9));
(d)  xPz _ yPz ! (x _ y)Pz (formula (11));
(e) 6 (x _ y)Pz ! xPz _ yPz (formula (10));
(f)  xPz ^ yPz ! (x _ y)Pz (formula (12));
(g) 6 (x _ y)Pz ! xPz ^ yPz (formula (o12));
Proof:
(a) The modal translation of this formula gives the following formula:
(x ^ :y) ^ :(y ^ :x)!
((x ^  ^ :y) ^ :(y ^  ^ :x)) _ ((x ^ : ^ :y) ^ :(y ^ : ^ :x))
Let us prove this formula. Suppose it is not true. That means that antecedent is
true and that consequent is false. That means furthermore that formulae (x^^
:y), (x^:^:y), (y ^^:x), (y ^:^:x) and (y ^:x) are all false, and
that (x ^ :y) is true. This is impossible, because it means that there is a world
where x ^ :y is true and that in the same world both x ^  ^ :y and x ^ : ^ :y
are false.
This proves our implication.
(b) The modal translation of this formula, using modal tautology (x _ y) $
x _ y, gives us a formula
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(x ^ :y ^ :z) ^ :(y ^ :x) ^ :(z ^ :x)!
(x ^ :y) ^ (x ^ :z) ^ :(y ^ :x) ^ :(z ^ :x)
An analysis of this formula shows us that one of (x ^ :y) and (x ^ :z) must
be false, which, together with the condition that (x^:y ^:z) must be true leads
to a contradiction. This proves our formula.
(c) For the other implication direction we need that modal formula (x^:y)^
(x ^ :z)! (x ^ :y ^ :z) is true, what generally is not the case.
(d) The modal translation of this formula, together with properties of operator
, gives us a formula
((x ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :x)) _ ((y ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :y))!
((x ^ :z) _ (y ^ :z)) ^ :(z ^ :x ^ :y)
For this formula to be false, disjunction (x^:z)_(y^:z) must be true, and
so formula (z ^ :x ^ :y) must also be true. But this is impossible, since at least
one of (z ^:x) and (z ^:y), according to hypothesis, must be false. That leads
to a contradiction, and that proves our formula.
(e) In order to prove this, we need to prove that there is a model where the
converse of the implication from proof under (d)) is not true. Such a model could be
(fw1; w2; w3g; ((w1; w2); (w1; w3)); v) where v is given by: v(w1; x) = >, v(w1; y) =
v(w1; z) = ?, v(w2; x) = >, v(w2; y) = v(w2; z) = ?, v(w3; x) = ?, v(w3; y) =
v(w3; z) = >.
That means that the formula (10) is not true,
(f) The modal translation of the formula (12) is
(x ^ :z) ^ (y ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :x) ^ :(z ^ :y)!
((x ^ :z) _ (y ^ :z)) ^ :(z ^ :x ^ :y)
Suppose that this formula is false. That means that (x ^ :z) and (y ^ :z)
are both true and that both (z ^ :x) and (z ^ :y) are false, what implies that
(z ^:x^:y) must be true (for implication to be false) which is impossible. That
proves the implication and, at the same time, validness of the formula (12).
(g) The formula to be falsied is the converse of the implication from previous
proof. One model where this formula is not true is (fw1; w2g; ((w1; w2)); v) where v
is given by: v(w1; x) = ?, v(w1; y) = ?, v(w1; z) = ?, v(w2; x) = ?, v(w2; y) = >,
v(w2; z) = ?.
So, this implication is not true, and that means that the converse of the formula
(12), i.e. the formula (o12), is also not true. 2
We also have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1.4 For P, we have:
(a)  (x ^ y)Pz ! xPz ^ yPz (formula (13));
(b) 6 xPz ^ yPz ! (x ^ y)Pz (formula (14));
(c)  (x ^ y)Pz ! xPz _ yPz (formula (15));
(d) 6 xPz _ yPz ! (x ^ y)Pz (formula (o15));
(e)  xP(y ^ z)! xPy _ xPz (formula (18));
(f) 6 xPy _ xPz ! xP(y ^ z) (formula (19));
(g)  xPy ^ xPz ! xP(y ^ z) (formula (20));
(h) 6 xP(y ^ z)! xPy ^ xPz (formula (o20));
Proof:
(a) The modal translation of this formula is
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(x^y^:z)^:(z^:x)^:(z^:y)! (x^:z)^(y^:z)^:(z^:x)^:(z^:y)
This implication is false if formula (x^y^:z) is true and at least one of (x^:z)
and (y ^ :z) is false, and this is not possible.
(b) The proof is reduced to the proof that formula (x ^ :z) ^ (y ^ :z) !
(x^ y ^:z) is not a theorem of modal logic, and a counter{model for that is easy
to nd.
(c) The proof is similar to the proof under (a). In this case, we need to prove
implication
(x ^ y ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :x) ^ :(z ^ :y)!
((x ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :x)) _ ((y ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :y))
This implication is false if (x ^ y ^ :z) is true and both (x ^ :z) and (y ^ :z)
are false, what is impossible.
(d) Modal formula here is the converse of the formula in the proof under (c),
and it is easy to see that one counter{model for this is: (fw1; w2g; ((w1; w2)); v) with
v given by: v(w1; x) = ?, v(w1; y) = ?, v(w1; z) = ?, v(w2; x) = >, v(w2; y) = ?,
v(w2; z) = ?.
(e) Modal translation gives us a formula
((x ^ :y) _ (x ^ :z)) ^ :(y ^ :x) ^ :(z ^ :x)!
((x ^ :y) ^ :(y ^ :x)) _ ((x ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :x))
and that reduces our proof to the proof that propositional formula (a_ b)^ c^ d!
(a ^ c) _ (b ^ d) is a tautology, and that is evidently true.
So, the formula (18) is true.
(f) The proof follows directly from the previous proof as the converse of the
above{presented propositional formula, i.e. formula (a^ c)_ (b^d)! (a_ b)^ c^d
is not a tautology. Of course, we can easily make a Kripke counter{model for the
respective modal formula.
(g) Modal translation of this formula is:
(x ^ :y) ^ :(y ^ :x) ^ (x ^ :z) ^ :(z ^ :x)!
((x ^ :y) _ (x ^ :z)) ^ :(y ^ :x) ^ :(z ^ :x)
which is further reduced to propositional formula a ^ b ^ c ^ d ! (a _ b) ^ c ^ d,
which is a tautology of propositional logic. That proves our implication.
(h) For converse of the formula (20) to be true, we need validness of the converse
of the implication from the proof under (g) which is not the case since a_ b! a^ b
is (obviously) not a tautology of propositional logic. 2
So, in our modal interpretation, from the list of formulae (1){(21), the following
are valid: (1){(8), (11){(13), (15){(18) and (20).
3.2 Modal logic and indierence relation
If we introduce the indierence relation I in the usual way, i.e. as xIy $
:(xPy) ^ :(yPx), using modal logic principles, we obtain:
xIy $ ((x ^ :y)$ (y ^ :x))
and its immediate consequence is the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2.1 The following is true:
(a) I is reexive;
(b) I is symmetric.
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But I is not necessarily an equivalence relation as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 3.2.2 I is not transitive.
Proof: The modal translation of the transitivity condition gives the following for-
mula:
((x ^ :y)$ (y ^ :x)) ^ ((y ^ :z)$ (z ^ :y))! ((x ^ :z)$ (z ^ :x))
One counter{model for this formula is:
(fw0; w1; w2; w3; w4; w5g; ((w0; w1); (w0; w2); (w0; w3); (w0; w4); (w0; w5)); v)
where v is given by v(w0; x ^ :z) = ?, v(w1; x) = v(w1; z) = >, v(w1; y) = ?,
v(w2; y) = >, v(w2; x) = ?, v(w3; x) = v(w3; z) = ?, v(w3; y) = >, v(w4; y) =
?, v(w4; z) = >, v(w5; x) = ? and v(w5; z) = >. Other (unspecied) variable
assignments in v are arbitrary.




The main application of preference relations should be in decision supporting sys-
tems. The idea is that a user gives his set of preferences, and the system decides
between what alternatives the user should choose. The following simple example is
from [KM75, pp.190{191]:
A bachelor has possibilities to spend the evening with Jane, to spend the evening
with Helen or to watch television. He gave the following set of preferences:
(10) I prefer to spend the evening with Jane than to watch television;
(20) I prefer to spend the evening with Helen than to watch television;
(30) I prefer to be alone than to be with both Jane and Helen;
Formally, his list of preferences is (t is television, j is Jane and h is Helen):
jP t; hP t; :(j ^ h)P (j ^ h):
Applying von Wright's system, we get the following list of states:
(j ^ :h ^ :t); (:j ^ h ^ :t); (:j ^ :h ^ :t)
that is not to watch television in any case!
Of course, it is very hard (maybe even impossible) to design a decision supporting
procedure that will give only one (i.e. the best) alternative | this procedure here is
useful for reducing the set of alternatives (unfortunately sometimes to an empty set)
the user faces (there were 8 alternatives in the example and the program eliminated
5 of them.).
4.2 The making of decision procedure
The main goal of this section is to make a procedure for deciding in the von Wright's
original systems (as described in [vW63] and [vW72]). The input to the procedure
is a list (set) of preferences (as in the above{presented example) and the output
should be a ranked set of states of aairs, as explained in [vW63] and [vW72].
Contrary to the discussion in previous chapters, this procedure is for the case when
outer logic is a classical logic as well.
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4.2.1 Theoretic foundations
In order to construct a procedure as described above, we will need the following
lemmas:
Lemma 4.2.1 Let fx1; : : : ; xng be a list of all variables that appear in preference,
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i 2 f0; 1g. Then
(1 _ 2)P3 $ 1P3 ^ 2P3:
Proof: In the proof we will need the following tautologies that are easy to prove:
() (x ^ (x _ y))$ x
() (x ^ (:x _ y))$ (x ^ y)
Applying the axiom (W4) we have
(1 _ 2)P3 $ (1 ^ :3)P (3 ^ :1 ^ :2) ^ (2 ^ :3)P (3 ^ :1 ^ :2).
Further, we have:
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In a similar way we prove that 2^:3 $ 2 as well as that (3^:1^:2)$
3. 2
Lemma 4.2.2 Let fx1; : : : ; xng be a list of all variables that appear in preference,
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i; i; i 2 f0; 1g. Then
1P (2 _ 3)$ 1P2 ^ 1P3:
Proof: Similar to the proof of lemma 4.2.1. 2
The immediate consequence of those two lemmas is:
Corollary 4.2.1 Let fx1; : : : ; xng be a list of all variables that appear in preference,
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n , where i; i; i; i 2 f0; 1g. Then
(1 _ 2)P (3 _ 4)$ 1P3 ^ 1P4 ^ 2P3 ^ 2P4:
We also need the following theorem from [vW63] (see also [KM75]):
Theorem 4.2.1 Suppose that P , $ 1 and  $  1, where 1 and  1 do not
contain any variable not already in  and  . Then 1P 1.
4.2.2 Decision procedure
According to the lemmas and theorems from the previous section, the main job in
constructing a decision{supporting procedure is to reduce propositional formulae,
that are arguments of the preference relation, into perfect disjunctive normal form
(i.e. the disjunction of conjunctions of all variables, or their negations, that appear
in preferences). After that, we only need to apply the axiom (W2) and the lemmas
and theorems above. The problem with this decision procedure is that we do not
48 CHAPTER 4. DECISION SUPPORTING SYSTEMS
want to prove if a system is consistent or not (i.e. to give an answer of the type
Yes/No), what can be easily done | we want to generate all acceptable states of
aairs for the given preference list.
The algorithm is as follows:
S1. Make a list V of all variables that appear in our preferences;
S2. Apply the axiom (W3) to every preference where a set of variables on the left
side is disjoint from the set of variables on the right side;
S3. For every x 2 V that appears only on the one side of preference relation, put
it also on the other side using tautology  $  ^ (x _ :x), and according to
theorem 4.2.1. Repeat this step until all variables of this preference relation
appear on both sides;
S4. If an argument of preference relation is not already in disjunctive normal form,
transform it into disjunctive normal form. After that, apply lemmas 4.2.1
and 4.2.2 and corollary 4.2.1 to obtain conjunction of preferences whose argu-
ments are only conjunctions of literals (i.e. of variables and their negations);
S5. If some variable from V is missing from some preference, apply axiom (W5)
to add it to that preference;
S6. Apply axiom (W2) to the obtained set of preferences.
The output from this procedure are relations between worlds (i.e. states of af-
fairs), and we can safely eliminate all worlds (out of 2n for n variables) that are
preferred by some other world.
Example: If we apply this procedure step by step to the `Jane{or{Helen{or{TV'
dilemma above, we get the following (we will write xy for x ^ y and x for :x, and
will use the following shorthand: 1  jht, 2  jht, 3  jht, 4  jht, 5  |ht,
6  |ht, 7  |ht and 8  |ht):
 after step (S1), we have V = fj; h; tg;
 step (S2) transforms our set of preferences into (jt)P (|t), (ht)P (ht), (| _
h)P (jh);
 step (S3) is not applicable;
 step (S4) rst transforms formula (| _ h)P (jh) into (|h _ jh _ |h)P (jh),
and after this step our set of preferences is (jt)P (|t), (ht)P (ht), (|h)P (jh),
(jh)P (jh), (|h)P (jh);
 after step (S5), our set of preferences is: 2P5, 4P7, 2P3, 6P7, 5P1, 6P2, 3P1,
4P2, 7P1, 8P2.
 step (S6) adds the following preferences: 2P1, 4P1, 6P1, 6P5, 6P3, 4P5,
4P3, 8P5, 8P3, 8P1;
As states 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 are preferred by some other states, we eliminate them,
and the set of alternatives that remains is f4; 6; 8g i.e. fjht; |ht; |htg.
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4.2.3 Remarks about the procedure
 Step S2 should be applied before other steps, otherwise we can obtain a con-
tradiction as shown in the following example: if our preference is xPy and
V = fx; yg applying S2, we obtain xyP xy and that is all we get, but if we
apply other steps before S2, we will also get a preference xyPxy that is a
contradictory one.
 For the same reason, we should apply step S4 before step S5.
 Applying transitivity only at the very end of the procedure does not change
the set of worlds we obtain. For instance, if our original preference set is xPy,
yPz, we get the same result no matter when we apply transitivity. Indeed,
rule S2 gives xyP xy, yzP yz, steps S3 and S4 are not applicable, step S5
adds xyzP xyz, xyzP xyz, xyzPxyz and xyzP xyz, and transitivity (step S6)
nally adds xyzP xyz and xyzP xyz. We obtain the same result if we also
apply transitivity at the very beginning, that is if we start from the set of
preferences xPy, yPz and xPz.
4.2.4 Modications for the extended system
As mentioned several times, von Wright's extended system was obtained from the
original one by adding axiom xPy ! xPz _ zPy. As dealing with disjunction of
preferences is generally hard, we are going to apply this axiom in another form i.e.
as xPy ^ :(xPz)! zPy and as xPy ^ :(zPy)! xPz.
According to this remark, we modify our decision procedure by adding the fol-
lowing steps:
S3.1 If the left side of preference relation is equal to the left side of some negated
preference, add the preference between the right side of the negated preference
and the right hand side of the one considered.
S3.2 If the right side of preference relation is equal to the right side of some negated
preference, add the preference between the left side of the considered prefer-
ence and the left side of the negated one.
4.2.5 Modications for indierence relation
According to von Wright, we have two dierent indierence relations, the weak
one and the strong one. We can do nothing with the weak one, except to replace
eventually every appearance of 'I by :('P ) ^ :( P').
As for the strong one, we have a dierent situation: because of principles (e1)
and (e2) from page 29, we can safely exchange in preferences states that are in
relation E.
So, for those relations, we add another two steps to our procedure:
S1.1 Replace every appearance of formula 'I with :('P ) ^ :( P');
S1.2 Apply the rule of symmetry to the relation E i.e. for every 'E , add  E' to
the set of preferences;
S1.3 Apply the same rules to the relation E as to the relation P ;
as well as the following two steps:
S5.1 If the left side of relation E is equal to the left side of some preference, add to
the set of preferences a preference whose left side is the right side of relation
E, and the right side is the right side of the considered preference;
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S5.2 If the left side of relation E is equal to the right side of some preference, add to
the set of preferences a preference whose right side is the right side of relation
E, and the left side is the left side of the considered preference;
4.3 Implementation
The above{described decision supporting procedure (prover) is implemented in
Common LISP ([Fra88],[Ste90]) in a version GC Lisp for PC computers1, but the
version presented in appendixA also runs under Unix. Input to this prover is the
name of the le where the set of preferences is given. Preferences are in LISP{form,
i.e. they are of the form (P<left> <right>). Expressions <left> and <right> are
also LISP{expressions, i.e. expressions in prex notation. Logical connectives are
AND, OR and NOT, where AND and OR could be of any arity. We also assume that every
preference is of the above{specied type, i.e. that there are no operations between
preferences. We will understand the set of preferences as the conjunction of them.
Another input parameter is the le that contains the list of all variables2. Vari-
ables are arbitrary words made from letters, but, as LISP does not make dierence
between upper{ and lower{case letters except in strings, it means that variables
Jane, jane and JANE (as well as the other 13 combinations) are all the same. This
le also contains a lter{formula, i.e. a formula that is used to reduce further (to
`ltrate') the set of alternatives, as explained in [MKRT75]. Namely, for every alter-
native that remains, we check if the lter is also true in this world (i.e. valuation),
and if not, we do not include this alternative into our nal list of alternatives. If
the user does not want to mess up with the lter, he can just leave that line empty
and that will mean that the lter is always true.
During its work, the prover creates several temporary les and the nal output
is also written into a le.
An example: For the example presented in section 4.1 on page 46, input to our
prover is
File wishlist.prf contains the following lines:
(P Jane television)
(P Helen television)
(P (NOT (AND Jane Helen)) (AND Jane Helen))
whereas le vars.prf contains the single line:
(Jane Helen television)
If we run our prover on this input, we will obtain the following set of worlds in the
le out.prf3:
(AND JANE (NOT HELEN) (NOT TELEVISION))
(AND (NOT JANE) HELEN (NOT TELEVISION))
(AND (NOT JANE) (NOT HELEN) (NOT TELEVISION))
However, if we want to have at least one of the options above (i.e. Jane, Helen
or TV), we add a lter (in notation from section 4.1) (j _ h _ t), i.e. le vars.prf
is:
1As the most of this thesis, the program was written when author was at the Computer Lin-
guistic department at the University of Saarland, Saarbrucken, Germany, in period from March{
September 1992, thanks to European Community stipend.
2In fact, this was not necessary, since it is possible to modify the prover to nd this list itself,
but in this way it makes life easier both to the program and to the programmer.
3Or in any le that user specied.
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(Jane Helen television)
(OR Jane Helen television)
and the program output will be:
(AND JANE (NOT HELEN) (NOT TELEVISION))
(AND (NOT JANE) HELEN (NOT TELEVISION))
4.3.1 Program description
The program is split into several modules, each of them corresponding to one step
in our procedure described in section 4.2.2 on page 47 as well as in the subsequent
sections. Here we will only describe the most important of them, and the complete
listing of the program is given in appendix A. The communication between modules
is over les: every module reads in (the internal representation of) the result of the
work of previous module, performs its function, and stores the result of its work
in another le. The master program decides upon the names of intermediate les
and takes care that all intermediate les are to be erased at the end of the nal
step. The version of the program described here only covers the basic version of the
decision procedure, but, as the program is modularly written, it is relatively easy
to add modules for the extended system and for the indierence relation.
do-vars Reads in a list of variables, makes pairs of variables and their internal
representations and at the end replaces every variable with its internal repre-
sentation. The input to this function is the name of the le that contains the
list of variables.
do-formulas It performs the following task on all formulae from the input le:
it splits them into the left hand part and the right hand part, replaces all
variables with their internal representation and writes resulting formulae into
the output le. The arguments to this function are the names of the input
and the output le.
step2 Applies the axiom (W3) to all formulae from the input le and stores the
result into the output le. The arguments to this function are the names of
the input and the output le.
step3 Performs step 3 to all formulae of the input le, and stores the resulting
formulae into the output le. The arguments to this function are the names
of the input and the output le.
step4 Performs step 4 to all formulae of the input le and stores the resulting
formulae into the output le. This step is split into two subparts:
(1.) Transform formulae into a perfect disjunctive normal form (for the given
list of variables). This task is performed by function pdnf, whose argu-
ments are the input formula and the list of variables.
(2.) Apply lemmas and theorems from section 4.2.1 on page 47.
The arguments to this function are the names of the input and the output
le.
step5 Application of the axiom (W5). The arguments to this function are the
names of the input and the output le.
trans-clos This function, for a given relation, nds its transitive closure ([Ben91]).
Its input is a relation (as the list of ordered pairs of elements) whose closure
is to be found, and the output is this closure.
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step6 This function reads from the input le ordered pairs of worlds (world =
one conjunct in a perfect disjunctive normal form) that are related one with
another, nds the transitive closure of this relation, and stores its result, as
the list of ordered pairs, into the output le. The arguments to this function
are the names of the input and the output le.
postprocessing This function eliminates all worlds that are on the right side of
preference relation from the list of worlds and translates the given result from
internal into original representation. The arguments to this function are the
names of 3 les: the input one, the intermediate one and the output one.
prover This function is the master function of the whole prover: it communicates
with the user, calls all of the above described modules and generates unique
names for all intermediate les.
The function prover is as follows:
; procedure that performs the main job: it reads the file
; names, calls all modules and gives the results
(DEFUN prover (&AUX input-prf input-var res-prf file-t1
file-t2 file-t3 file-t4 file-t5 file-t6 file-t7)
(SETQ input-prf (read-and-check "input"))
(SETQ input-var (read-and-check "variables"))
(TERPRI)


















(postprocessing file-t6 file-t7 res-prf)
(delete-files *all-f-names*))





;; contains declarations for all global variables
(in-package "WRIGHT")
(DEFVAR *v-names* NIL "List of variable names.")
(DEFVAR *all-f-names* NIL "List of temporary file names.")
(DEFVAR *filter* NIL "Filter formula.")
(DEFVAR *prefvars* NIL "List of pairs (ord-number variable).")
(DEFVAR *all-worlds* NIL "List of all states of affairs.")
(DEFVAR *checked-contrad* NIL "Checked for a contradiction.")
(DEFVAR *contrad* NIL "Contains all contradictions found.")
(DEFVAR *dont-ask* NIL "If to ask about contradictions.")
(DEFVAR *left-side* NIL "Worlds on the left side of preferences.")
(DEFVAR *right-side* NIL "Worlds on the right side of preferences.")
(DEFVAR *allowed-worlds* NIL "Worlds that remained.")
A.2 File include.lsp
;;; file include.lsp
;; contains functions needed in all modules
(in-package "WRIGHT")
;; function my-error takes care of errors, give diagnostic
; message and exits the program
; code 1: file does not exist
; code 2: variable from formula is not in the list
; code 3: something happened to file from previous step
; code 4: some variable was forgotten before step 5
; code 5: there is a contradiction in preferences
; code 6: list of variables was empty
; code 7: could not create unique file name in 40 tries
(DEFUN my-error (code text)
(TERPRI)
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(CASE code
(1 (PRIN1 text) (PRINC "-- file does not exist"))
(2 (PRIN1 text) (PRINC "-- var does not exist"))
(3 (PRIN1 text) (PRINC "-- file vanished"))
(4 (PRIN1 text) (PRINC "-- some vars are missing"))
(5 (PRINC "There is a contradiction:")
(DOLIST (item text)
(PRINT (CONS 'P (LIST (in2var (CAR item))
(in2var (CADR item)))))))
(6 (PRIN1 text) (PRINC "--variable list is empty"))
(7 (PRINC "Could not create file name")))
(TERPRI)




; function deletes all temporary files, their names are
; in the list that is suplied as argument
(DEFUN delete-files (llist)
(DOLIST (i (REVERSE llist))
(IF (PROBE-FILE i) (DELETE-FILE i))))
; function that prints a line and newline after that.
; built-in PRINT first print a newline, then text and
; after that one space
(DEFUN my-print (text file)
(PRIN1 text file)
(TERPRI file))
; this function looks if the file exists and if not
; it returns error message back
(DEFUN not-exists? (file-name code)
(IF (NULL (PROBE-FILE file-name)) (my-error code file-name)))
; this function reads file name and check if it exists.
; if not it tries again
(DEFUN read-and-check(text &AUX res)
(LOOP
(FORMAT t "~%The name of the ~A file:" text)
(SETQ res (READ-LINE))
(IF (AND (> (LENGTH res) 0) (PROBE-FILE res))
(RETURN res)
(FORMAT t " The file ~A does not exist! Try again." res))))
;; general operations on the lists
;; set operations





((ATOM (CAR llist)) (CONS (CAR llist) (narrow (CDR llist))))
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(T (APPEND (narrow (CAR llist)) (narrow (CDR llist))))))
; removes elements listed in l1 from llist
; it first narrows the llist
(DEFUN rm-el-l (llist l1 &AUX res)
(SETQ res (narrow llist))
(DOLIST (i l1 res)
(SETQ res (REMOVE i res))))
; remove duplicates from the list
(DEFUN rm-dp(llist)
(REMOVE-DUPLICATES llist :test #'EQUAL))
; makes the set-union of two lists
(DEFUN my-union (list1 list2)
(REMOVE-DUPLICATES (APPEND list1 list2) :test #'EQUAL))
; set difference of two lists
(DEFUN difference (list1 list2)
(SET-DIFFERENCE list1 list2 :test #'EQUAL))
; set intersection of two lists, it also works on atoms
(DEFUN my-intersec (l1 l2)
(COND
((OR (NULL l1) (NULL l2)) NIL)
((AND (ATOM l1) (ATOM l2)) (my-intersec (LIST l1) (LIST l2)))
((ATOM l1) (IF (MEMBER l1 l2 :test #'EQUAL) (LIST l1) NIL))
((ATOM l2) (IF (MEMBER l2 l1 :test #'EQUAL) (LIST l2) NIL))
(T (INTERSECTION l1 l2 :test #'EQUAL))))
; Makes direct product of lists
(DEFUN mul (llist &AUX res)
(SETQ res (CAR llist))
(DOLIST (item (CDR llist))
(SETQ res (REVERSE (product item res))))
(REVERSE (MAPCAR #'REVERSE res)))
; makes direct product of two lists
(DEFUN product (list1 list2)
(COND
((NULL list1) NIL)
(T (APPEND (merge-el (CAR list1) list2)
(product (CDR list1) list2)))))




(IF (ATOM (CAR llist)) (LIST x (CAR llist))
(CONS x (CAR llist)))
(merge-el x (CDR llist))))))
; assigns an ordered number to every member
(DEFUN ord-numb (llist)
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(rdbr 1 llist))
(DEFUN rdbr (n llist)
(COND
((NULL llist) NIL)
(T (CONS (LIST n (CAR llist)) (rdbr (+ 1 n) (CDR llist))))))
(DEFUN literal? (boolean) ; if literal
(OR (poslit? boolean) (neglit? boolean)))
(DEFUN poslit? (boolean) ; if positive literal
(ATOM boolean))
(DEFUN neglit? (boolean) ; if negative literal
(AND (LISTP boolean)
(EQ (CAR boolean) 'not)
(poslit? (CADR boolean))))
; Sorts list of numbers in increasing order for abs.
; As SORT destroys its argument, we have to copy its contest
(DEFUN abs-sort (llist)
(SORT (COPY-LIST llist) #'< :key #'abs))
; includes x in list so that list is sorted, if
; x is already in a list, does nothing
(DEFUN include-by-size (x llist)
(COND
((NULL llist) (LIST x))
((ATOM llist) (include-by-size x (LIST llist)))
(T (abs-sort (ADJOIN x llist :key #'ABS)))))
;;; pseudo-random-number generator, generates letters and returns
;;; a string of len such letters
(DEFUN random-string (len &AUX res)
(SETQ res (LIST (+ 65 (RANDOM 26))))
(DOTIMES (i (- len 1) res)
(SETQ res (CONS (+ 65 (RANDOM 26)) res)))
(FORMAT nil "~{~C~}" (MAPCAR #'CHARACTER res)))
;; find unique name for the file
; file is of (DOS) length 8+3, all random





(SETQ i (+ 1 i))
(IF (> i 40) (my-error 7 NIL))
(SETQ file-name
(FORMAT nil "~A.~A"
(random-string 8) (random-string 3)))
(IF (PROBE-FILE file-name) (GO again))
(SETQ *all-f-names* (CONS file-name *all-f-names*))
(RETURN file-name)))
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; for a given world, translate it into a number
; from 0 to 2^number-of-variables -1
(DEFUN l-to-n (llist &AUX res j)
(SETQ res 0
j 1)
(DOLIST (i (REVERSE llist) res)
(IF (> i 0)
(SETQ res (+ res j)))
(SETQ j (* 2 j))))
; translates given number into a list of length len




(DOTIMES (i1 len res)
(SETQ res (CONS (- 0 i1 1) res)))
(LOOP
(IF (ZEROP i) (RETURN (REVERSE res)))
(IF (> (MOD i 2) 0)
(SETQ res (SUBST j (- j) res)))
(SETQ i (FLOOR i 2)




; reads a line from the file, reads a list of variables,
; makes ordered pairs, and then replaces every variable with




(si file-name :direction :input)
(SETQ *v-names* (READ si NIL NIL))
(IF (NULL *v-names*)
(my-error 6 file-name))
(SETQ *prefvars* (ord-numb *v-names*)
*filter* (READ si NIL NIL))
(IF (NULL *filter*) (SETQ *filter* T))))
; It finds index of variable in a list that is a list of
; ordered pairs where second element is a variable. The
; first element is 0, and function returns NIL if this
; variable is not in the list.
(DEFUN find-index (var vlist)
(POSITION var vlist :key #'CADR))
; replace every variable in a formula with its number in the
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; list. The list is a list of pairs (number variable)
(DEFUN repl-var (formula llist &AUX fff varlist ind replment)
(SETQ fff (narrow formula)
varlist (MAPCAR #'CADR llist))
(COND
((ATOM formula)
(CAR (NTH (find-index formula llist) llist)))
(T (DOLIST (var1 fff)
(COND
((MEMBER var1 varlist :test #'EQUAL)
(SETQ ind (find-index var1 llist))
(COND
((NOT (NULL ind))
(SETQ replment (CAR (NTH ind llist))
formula (SUBST replment var1 formula)))))
(T (COND
((NOT (MEMBER var1 '(and or -) :test #'EQUAL))
(my-error 2 var1))))))
formula)))
;; It works on all formulas from the given file: it splits
;; it into left and right part, it substitutes variables and
;; stores result into another file.
(DEFUN do-formulas (fname-1 fname-2)
(not-exists? fname-1 1)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(so fname-2 :direction :output)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(si fname-1 :direction :input)




(repl-var (SUBST '- 'not (CADR formula)) *prefvars*)





; formula W3 is applied if left and right side of the
; relation have no variables in common, otherwise don't apply
; it (no need for). It returns T if lists of variables are
; disjoint, NIL otherwise
(DEFUN crit-W3 (left right)
(NULL (my-intersec (narrow left) (narrow right))))
; as literals are numbers, complementing it just changes a
; sign of it
(DEFUN complement (literal)
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(- literal))
; de Morgan's laws, negates formula
(DEFUN de-morgan (boolean)
(COND
((literal? boolean) (complement boolean))
((CASE (CAR boolean)
(AND (CONS 'or (MAPCAR #'de-morgan (CDR boolean))))
(OR (CONS 'and (MAPCAR #'de-morgan (CDR boolean))))
(- (CADR boolean))))))
; application of axiom W3, list = ((left) (right)) and that
; corresponds to left P right
(DEFUN apply-W3 (left right)
(LIST (CONS 'and (LIST left (de-morgan right)))
(CONS 'and (LIST right (de-morgan left)))))
; perform step 2 (axiom (W3) on input file
(DEFUN step2 (fname1 fname2 &AUX left right a-new)
(not-exists? fname1 3)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(so fname2 :direction :output)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(si fname1 :direction :input)
(DO* ((formula (READ si NIL NIL) (READ si NIL NIL)))
((NULL formula) NIL)
(SETQ left (CAR formula)
right (CADR formula))
(IF (crit-w3 left right)
(SETQ a-new (apply-W3 left right))





;; step 3 is applied if the list of variables on one side
;; is different from the list of variables on the other side
; finds all variables that are on the left hand side and not
; on the right hand side.
(DEFUN only-on-one (lft rht &AUX l d)
(COND
((ATOM lft) (SETQ l (LIST lft))
(IF (ATOM rht)
(SETQ d (LIST rht))
(SETQ d (rm-dp (MAPCAR #'ABS (rm-el-l rht '(- and or)))))))
((ATOM rht) (SETQ d (LIST rht))
(IF (ATOM lft)
(SETQ l (LIST lft))
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(SETQ l (rm-dp (MAPCAR #'ABS (rm-el-l lft '(- and or)))))))
(T (SETQ l (rm-dp (MAPCAR #'ABS (rm-el-l lft '(- and or)))))
(SETQ d (rm-dp (MAPCAR #'ABS (rm-el-l rht '(- and or)))))))
(difference l d))
; adds a variable: formula goes to (and formula (or x (not x)))
; where x is that new variable
(DEFUN add-var (formula v1)
(CONS 'and (LIST formula (CONS 'or (LIST v1 (complement v1))))))
; adds to formula all variables from the list
(DEFUN completev (formula llist)
(COND
((NULL llist) formula)
(T (DOLIST (var1 llist formula)
(SETQ formula (add-var formula var1))))))
(DEFUN step3 (fname1 fname2 &AUX left right o-left o-right)
(not-exists? fname1 3)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(so fname2 :direction :output)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(si fname1 :direction :input)
(DO* ((formula (READ si NIL NIL) (READ si NIL NIL)))
((NULL formula) NIL)
(SETQ left (CAR formula)
right (CADR formula)
o-left (only-on-one left right)
o-right (only-on-one right left))
(my-print (LIST (completev left o-right)




;; we have to do two different things: 1. translate formulas
;; into perfect disjunctive normal form (for given list of
;; variables, and 2. apply lemmas and theorems of
;; distributivity
; formulas of the kind (or f1 (or f2 f3) ...) translates
; into (or f1 f2 f3 ...)
(DEFUN or-up (fla)
(COND
((EQUAL (CAR fla) 'or) (move-or fla))
(T fla)))
(DEFUN move-or (fla &AUX res)
(SETQ res (LIST 'or))
(DOLIST (item (CDR fla) res)
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(COND
((ATOM item) (SETQ res (APPEND res (LIST item))))
(T (COND
((EQUAL (CAR item) 'or)
(SETQ res (APPEND res (CDR (or-up item)))))
(T (SETQ res (APPEND res (LIST item)))))))))
; function transforms list (((x1 x2 ...)) ... ((y1 y2 ...)))
; into ((x1 x2 ...) ... (y1 y2 ...))
(DEFUN level-up (llist)
(MAPCAR #'narrow llist))
; transforms formula into dnf formula. Arguments of the
; formula are numbers and negation is already replaced with
; -, here we will replace positive numbers with negative
(DEFUN dnf (fla)
(IF (literal? fla) (LIST fla)
(CASE (CAR fla)
(- (dnf (de-morgan (CADR fla))))
(or (level-up (MAPCAR #'dnf (CDR (or-up fla)))))
(and (MAPCAR #'rm-dp
(MAPCAR #'narrow
(mul (MAPCAR #'dnf (CDR fla)))))))))
; for formula in dnf (i.e without operators) finds the list
; of all variables
(DEFUN l-of-vars (fla)
(rm-dp (MAPCAR #'ABS (rm-el-l fla '(and or)))))
; adds all combinations of new variables into formula
; (completion to perfect DNF)
(DEFUN pdnf-compl (fla vlist &AUX var1 left1 left2)
(COND
((NULL vlist) fla)
(T (SETQ var1 (CAR vlist)
left1 (include-by-size var1 fla)
left2 (include-by-size (- var1) fla))
(LIST (pdnf-compl left1 (CDR vlist))
(pdnf-compl left2 (CDR vlist))))))
; The list of the form (((x y) (a b)) ((p q) (r s)))
; transforms into ((x y) (a b) (p q) (r s)). More general:
; binary tree transforms into linear list. More general:
; arbitrary tree transforms into linear list
(DEFUN tree-to-list (llist &AUX res)
(COND
((NULL llist) NIL)
((ATOM (CAR llist)) (LIST llist))
(T (SETQ res NIL)
(DOLIST (item llist res)
(SETQ res (APPEND res (tree-to-list item)))))))
; function transforms formula into PDNF with respect to the
; list of added variables that is the second argument to the
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; function. formula is already in DNF, we only add
; new variables. The principle is the same as in step 5
; (with small modifications).
(DEFUN pdnf (fla list-var1 &AUX res f1)
(SETQ res NIL)
(IF (ATOM fla)
(SETQ f1 (LIST fla))
(SETQ f1 fla))
(DOLIST (item f1 (tree-to-list res))
(SETQ res (APPEND res (pdnf-compl item list-var1)))))
; it takes formulas and transform them into PDNF, and
; finally, step 4 and lemmas and theorems of distributivity
(DEFUN step4 (inp-file out-file &AUX left right var1)
(not-exists? inp-file 3)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(so out-file :direction :output)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(si inp-file :direction :input)
(DO* ((fla (READ si NIL NIL) (READ si NIL NIL)))
((NULL fla) NIL)
(SETQ left (dnf (CAR fla))
right (dnf (CADR fla))
var1 (my-union (l-of-vars left) (l-of-vars right))
left (rm-dp (pdnf left var1))
right (rm-dp (pdnf right var1)))
(DOLIST (a-new (product left right))




;; Application of axiom W5 i.e. adding variables. In this
;; stage, formulas are already simple conjunctions
;; represented as simple list of numbers with sign - if
;; variable is negated. Also, the list of variables on the
;; left hand side and the right hand side is the same,
;; thanks to previous steps.




(rm-dp (MAPCAR #'ABS (narrow formula)))))
; adds all possible combinations of variables in a formula
; and stores the resulting formula into output file
(DEFUN completev-w5 (fla vlist out-file &AUX left right
var1 left1 left2 right1 right2)
(COND
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((NULL vlist) (my-print (MAPCAR #'l-to-n (MAPCAR #'abs-sort fla))
out-file))
(T (SETQ left (CAR fla)
right (CADR fla)
var1 (CAR vlist)
left1 (include-by-size var1 left)
right1 (include-by-size var1 right)
left2 (include-by-size (- var1) left)
right2 (include-by-size (- var1) right))
(completev-w5 (LIST left1 right1) (CDR vlist) out-file)
(completev-w5 (LIST left2 right2) (CDR vlist) out-file))))
; step 5
(DEFUN step5 (inp-file out-file &AUX addsl addsr)
(not-exists? inp-file 3)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(so out-file :direction :output)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(si inp-file :direction :input)
(DO* ((fla (READ si NIL NIL) (READ si NIL NIL)))
((NULL fla) NIL)
(SETQ addsl (list-to-add (CAR fla))
addsr (list-to-add (CADR fla)))
(IF (NOT (EQUAL addsl addsr)) (my-error 4 fla))




;; stuff related to step 6, i.e. transitive closure of a
;; given relation
; makes an array out of relation
(DEFUN rel-to-arr (relation nmr-vars &AUX a m)
(SETQ m (EXPT 2 nmr-vars)
a (MAKE-ARRAY (LIST m m) :element-type '(MOD 2)
:initial-element 0))
(DOLIST (it relation a)
(SETF (APPLY #'BIT a it) 1)))
; makes a relation out of an array
(DEFUN arr-to-rel (my-arr &AUX res d2)
(SETQ d2 (CADR (ARRAY-DIMENSIONS my-arr))
res NIL)
(DOTIMES (i (CAR (ARRAY-DIMENSIONS my-arr)))
(DOTIMES (j d2)
(IF (= 1 (BIT my-arr i j))
(SETQ res (CONS (LIST i j) res)))))
res)
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; defines closure of given relation, where relation is
; represented as a list of ordered pairs of numbers.
; Warshall's algorithm.
(DEFUN tr-rel (relation &AUX arr2 n tmpb-ik ai ak ta m)
(SETQ arr2 (rel-to-arr relation (LENGTH *v-names*))
n (CAR (ARRAY-DIMENSIONS arr2)))
(DOTIMES (k n)
(SETQ ak (MAKE-ARRAY n :displaced-to arr2
:displaced-index-offset (* k n)
:element-type '(MOD 2)))
(DOTIMES (i n)
(SETQ tmpb-ik (BIT arr2 i k))
(SETQ m (* i n)
ai (MAKE-ARRAY n :displaced-to arr2
:displaced-index-offset m
:element-type '(MOD 2))
ta (MAKE-ARRAY n :element-type '(MOD 2)
:initial-element tmpb-ik))
(BIT-IOR ai (BIT-AND ta ak NIL) T)))
(arr-to-rel arr2))
; This function reads in the pairs of worlds from the file
; inp-file, finds transitive closure and stores the result, as
; the list of pairs in the file out-file




(si inp-file :direction :input)
(DO* ((formula (READ si NIL NIL) (READ si NIL NIL)))
((NULL formula) NIL)
(SETQ relation (ADJOIN formula relation :test #'EQUAL))))
(SETQ relation (tr-rel relation))
(WITH-OPEN-FILE






; makes the list of all variables from one (left or right)
; side of relation.
(DEFUN which-side (inp-file side &AUX res operation tmpv ip tf)
(SETQ res NIL)
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(si inp-file :direction :input)
(DO* ((formula (READ si NIL NIL) (READ si NIL NIL)))
((NULL formula) NIL)
(SETQ tf (EQUAL (CAR formula) (CADR formula)))




(FORMAT t "~%Contradiction found! ~
Do you want to ignore it? (Y/N) ")
(SETQ ip (READ))
(IF (EQUAL ip 'Y)
(SETQ *checked-contrad* T))))
(IF (AND (NULL *checked-contrad*) tf)
(SETQ *contrad* (APPEND *contrad* (LIST formula))))
(SETQ tmpv (APPLY operation (LIST formula)))
(IF (NOT (MEMBER tmpv res :test #'EQUAL))
(SETQ res (APPEND res (LIST tmpv))))))
(IF (NULL *checked-contrad*) (SETQ *checked-contrad* T))
res)
; all worlds on the left hand side
(DEFUN left-side (inp-file)
(which-side inp-file 'left))
; all worlds on the right hand side
(DEFUN right-side (inp-file)
(which-side inp-file 'right))
; check if there is a contradiction
(DEFUN contradiction? ()
(NOT (NULL *contrad*)))
; function generates all possible worlds
(DEFUN all-worlds (&AUX res)
(SETQ res NIL)
(DOTIMES (i (EXPT 2 (LENGTH *v-names*)) res)
(SETQ res (CONS i res))))
; worlds that are allowed, i.e. all except those on the right
; hand side of any preference
(DEFUN allowed-worlds()
(difference *all-worlds* *right-side*))
; function translates internal representation into
; the original one.
(DEFUN in2var (formula &AUX r)
(SETQ r (n-to-l formula (LENGTH *v-names*)))
(DOLIST (itm r r) ; the first r is evaluated before loop!
(IF (< itm 0)
(SETQ r (SUBST (CONS 'not (LIST (- itm))) itm r))))
(DOLIST (itm *prefvars* r)
(SETQ r (SUBST (CADR itm) (CAR itm) r)))
(CONS 'and r))
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; we want to evaluate formula given a valuation of its
; variables. We need it to implement filter possibility.
; we assume that valuation is a list of ordered pairs
; (value var-name), and that formula is a wff
; (with and, or, not))
(DEFUN valuate (formula valuation &AUX res)
(SETQ res formula)
(DOLIST (item valuation (eval res))
(SETQ res (SUBST (CAR item) (CADR item) res))))
; from *allowed-worlds* makes a list of valuations of above type
; argument world is one state of affairs
(DEFUN make-value (world &AUX r w)
(SETQ r NIL)
(DOLIST(vv world r)
(IF (< vv 0) (SETQ w NIL) (SETQ w T))
(SETQ r (CONS (LIST w (NTH (- (abs vv) 1) *v-names*)) r))))
; This function applies above procedure to all formulas in
; the file











(so inter :direction :output)
(DOLIST (item *allowed-worlds*)
(IF (valuate *filter* (make-value (n-to-l item len)))
(my-print item so))))
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(so out-file :direction :output)
(WITH-OPEN-FILE
(si inter :direction :input)
(DO* ((formula (READ si NIL NIL) (READ si NIL NIL)))
((NULL formula) NIL)




; This functions sets to nil all global variables that were
; used in program. This is necessary for memory savings if
; we run the program again
(DEFUN erase-global ()












; reads all program files necessary for the program
(DEFUN load-all ()
(LOAD "variable.lsp" :verbose NIL)
(LOAD "include.lsp" :verbose NIL)
(LOAD "step1.lsp" :verbose NIL)
(LOAD "step2.lsp" :verbose NIL)
(LOAD "step3.lsp" :verbose NIL)
(LOAD "step4.lsp" :verbose NIL)
(LOAD "step5.lsp" :verbose NIL)
(LOAD "step6.lsp" :verbose NIL)
(LOAD "postproc.lsp" :verbose NIL))
; procedure that performs the main job: it reads the file
; names, calls all modules and gives the results
(DEFUN prover (&AUX input-prf input-var res-prf file-t1
file-t2 file-t3 file-t4 file-t5 file-t6 file-t7)
(SETQ input-prf (read-and-check "input")
input-var (read-and-check "variables"))
(TERPRI)



























(PRINC "Again? (Y/N) ")
(SETQ again (READ))
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